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ABSTRACT 
Gun violence in America must be addressed at the highest levels of society. Newtown, 
Aurora, and Virginia Tech were attacks on the very fabric of America. School shootings 
represent attacks on our nations’ future. A public health approach to gun violence focuses 
on prevention. Public safety professionals, educators and community leaders are 
squandering opportunities to prevent horrific acts of extreme violence. Preparedness is 
derived by planning, which is critical to mobilizing resources when needed. Rational 
public policy can work. Sensible gun legislation, which is accessible through a public 
health approach to gun violence, neither marginalizes nor stigmatizes any one group. 
University administrators must fully engage the entire arsenal of resources available to 
confront this pernicious threat. The academic community can create powerful networks 
for research, collaboration and information sharing. These collective learning 
environments are investments in the knowledge economy. In order for the police to 
remain relevant, they must actively engage the community they serve by developing the 
operational art necessary to cultivate knowledge, relationships and expertise. Police 
departments must emphasize strategies that improve performance. Police officers must 
understand the mission and meaning of “To Protect and Serve” and the consequences of 
public safety, which often comes at their personal peril. Gun violence in America is a 
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I. INTRODUCTION TO SCHOOL SHOOTINGS IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE HOMELAND SECURITY ENTERPRISE 
Over the past decade, the homeland security enterprise has evolved as the world 
has become more complex, threats have changed, and the impacts of global and local 
networks have collided. No longer solely the domain of terrorism, homeland security has 
taken on a wider array of complex tasks, adding to its portfolio of responsibility issues 
that had long been left to others or unattended. World economic turmoil, international 
crisis events, civil wars, insurgencies and conflicts, as well as government financial 
constraints, have forced the homeland security network to get leaner, more efficient and 
adapt more quickly to worldwide events.  
At the same time, homeland security has taken on more complex issues and 
expanded its domain to look for better solutions to complex problems, refine strategy and 
improve collaboration. Many of the challenges that confront the various sectors of the 
homeland security enterprise affect other areas as well. Pandemics, earthquakes and 
terrorist bombings have striking similarities. Planning, response and resiliency rely on 
collaborative networks of community and government officials, citizens and private 
sector stakeholders to develop the frameworks necessary to solve complex problems, 
improve performance, expedite sound decision making and reduce costs.     
It is through this lens that we look for other opportunities to improve this 
collaborative framework, share ideas and information and solve wicked problems in the 
homeland security enterprise.1 
A. VIOLENCE IN AMERICA  
Violence in America impacts people’s lives and drains considerable resources.  
Gun violence is particularly destructive, considerably more insidious than most 
                                                 
1 Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, Policy 
Sciences, June 1973, Volume 4, Issue 2, 155–169. http://link.springer.com/article 
/10.1007%2FBF01405730?LI=true. As first described by Rittel and Webber, wicked problems are difficult 
to describe, have many causes and defy simple solutions. Poverty, climate change and terrorism are classic 




Americans understand and much more pervasive in the United States than in any other 
country in the world. 
Researchers at Iowa State University estimate the cost to society for each murder 
in America amounts to $17,250,000.2  Firearm-related fatalities in the United States have 
averaged 32,300 annually since 1980.3 After motor vehicle accidents, it is the second 
leading cause of death in America. It is estimated that two nonfatal shooting injuries 
occur for every firearm-related death. More than 300,000 Americans are victims of a 
violent crime committed with a firearm every year.4  The collateral damage for families 
and loved ones is estimated in the millions of lives affected every year. Guns are the 
weapon of choice in 68 percent of all homicides, 52 percent of all suicides, 43 percent of 
all robberies, and 21 percent of all felony assaults.5 Guns account for 6.6 percent of the 
premature deaths in this country.6   
The United States is a clear outlier in the international community for gun 
violence. The fatality rate due to firearm-related violence is more than five times the rate 
in any other industrialized nation.7  By a large measure, firearm-related homicide, suicide 
and unintentional death is higher in the United States than the next 25 other high-income 
countries.8    
                                                 
2 “ISU Team Calculates Societal Costs of Five Major Crimes; Finds Murders at $15.25 Million,”  
Iowa State University News Service (27 September 2010). Available: 
http://archive.news.iastate.edu/news/2010/sep/costofcrime. 
3 Firearm Injury in the U.S. Firearm and Injury Center at Penn (2009), The University of Pennsylvania 
Health System, 5. Available: 
http://www.uphs.upenn.edu/ficap/resourcebook/Final%20Resource%20Book%20Updated%202009%20Se
ction%201.pdf#page=7.  
4 “How Prevalent is Gun Violence in America?” National Institute of Justice (26 October 2010). U.S. 
Dept. of Justice. Available: http://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/gun-violence/welcome.htm  
5 Firearm Injury in the U.S., 5, Source: National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, CDC. 
http://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/index.html. 
6 Ibid. 
7 E. G. Krug, J. A. Mercy, L .L. Dahlberg, and K. E. Powell, “Firearm and Non Firearm-related 
Homicide Among Children,”  Homicide Studies 2 (1998): 83–95. 
8 R. A. Hahn, Oleg Bilukha, Alex Crosby, Mindy T. Fillilove, Akiva Liberman, Eve Moscicki, Susan 
Snyder, Faris Tuma, and Peter A. Brias, “Firearms Laws and the Reduction of Violence: A Systematic 
Review,”  Task Force on Community Preventive Services. American Journal of Preventive Medicine 




Bombings, shootings, deaths and injuries are anathema to our highest ideals of 
educational freedom and open expression that are the central tenets that exist on our 
college and university campuses today. Understanding the history of these events may 
illuminate a pathway to safety and security by identifying patterns, persons, pathologies, 
conditions and techniques common to these devastating events.  
B. FIREARM INJURIES AS A PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUE 
Gun violence is generally viewed as a crime problem, gun suicides as a mental 
health problem and accidental shootings as a safety issue. While each emphasize 
prevention, there has been little effort, until recently, to bring together these diverse 
interests and focus on a broad array of policies that can significantly impact gun injuries 
and death. This full spectrum collaborative analysis focusing on prevention is referred to 
as the public health approach to reducing gun injuries and death.9  
Firearm-related injury and death are preventable and represent a significant public 
health issue. Research on firearm-related injury provides abundant evidence that specific 
legislative changes in law and technology can be made to reduce the deaths, disability, 
and subsequent costs—both in terms of lives lost and economic impacts—to society. 
Firearms are devastatingly effective weapons with the capability of escalating 
impulse-driven acts of interpersonal violence or suicidal thoughts into death, sometimes 
on a massive scale. As discussed in detail below, states with higher rates of household 
firearm ownership have significantly higher homicide victimization rates.10 Finally, and 
most importantly, firearm injury disproportionately affects young people.11  Among the 
leading causes of death for persons ages 15–24, homicide ranks second and suicide third 
                                                 
9 David Hemenway, “Private Guns Public Health,” The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 
2004, 8. 
10 Firearm Injury in the U.S., 5. 
11 In 1992, school shooting data became much more reliable and accurate with the advent of in-depth 
analysis by the National School Safety Center, which was created in 1984 with federal funding directed by 
President Ronald Reagan. Homicide incidents in the early 1990s were almost exclusively single-victim 




with the majority of both related to firearms. Many diseases that attract more public 
attention and research cause far fewer deaths.12 
C. PROBLEM SOLVING IN THE HOMELAND SECURITY ENTERPRISE 
(HSE): AN INTERDISCIPLINARY COLLABORATIVE FRAMEWORK   
The issue of gun violence in America is too broad to confront generally. There are 
too many causes, considerations and consequences, as well as too much metadata to 
analyze that would render the effort meaningless within the constraints of a thesis.  
The purpose of this thesis is to take a common homeland security problem-
solving technique—an interdisciplinary collaborative framework—and apply it to gun 
violence in educational environments and, more specifically, to rampage shootings and 
mass murders at colleges and universities. By examining this specific type of extreme 
violence and exploring the pathologies and conditions conducive to it in the singular 
cohesive university environment, we intend to determine which prevention, protection, 
response and resiliency techniques are necessary to apply these findings, as well as make 
specific recommendations that can be applied to the community at large.  
In order to better understand the opportunities for interdiction, we must first 
understand the behavioral, social and cultural context of school shootings. 
This thesis takes a public health approach to gun violence to determine likely 
effective prevention, protection, response and resiliency techniques that can be taken to 
reduce the impact of these devastating yet preventable events. 
A chapter has been included in this thesis about extreme violence in international 
educational environments related to terrorism. Thankfully, America has not experienced 
such an event on a destructive and massive scale. This information has been included to 
inform the reader of the acute risk involved if terrorists were to pursue executing such an 
attack in America. While these events are considered outliers, they must be taken into 
                                                 





consideration when developing and implementing a comprehensive response strategy.13  
Responding to terrorist events in educational environments requires thorough, 
comprehensive and well thought-out strategies, proper training and diligent preparation. 
Predictive policing strategies suggest that preparation for the worst-possible, low-
probability event improves the chances that more probable events are handled more 
effectively, efficiently and expeditiously with lower impacts.  
D. APPLICATIONS TO SOCIETY AT LARGE 
Colleges and universities were chosen for this study because of their sense of 
community cohesiveness, similarities to society at large and for their depth of resources. 
Educational environments were selected because they represent our nation’s future.  
As the homeland security enterprise has evolved, so have school shootings. Once 
the domain of single victim events, as semiautomatic weapons have become more 
accessible and extended magazines more prevalent, school shootings have resulted in far 
greater casualties.  
E. LASTING VICTIMS OF GUN VIOLENCE 
While the murders committed during these horrendous events of gun violence are 
terrible, an even larger number of Americans suffer lifelong debilitating injuries, post-
traumatic stress disorder and terrible memories that deserve our attention, consideration, 
medical and psychological treatment. Student survivors speak of lost hopes and dreams, 
loves and friends all destroyed by acts of extraordinary violence. Their memories are 
seared with images of beloved friends dying next to them and the anguish of being 
incapable and unable to help or comfort them, save them or reduce their misery.14  These 
are the lasting victims of gun violence in America.  
 
                                                 
13 Ted G Lewis, Bak’s Sand Pile: Strategies for a Catastrophic World (Williams, California: Agile 
Press, 2011), 361. 
14 “The Killer at Thurston High, What Led a 15-year-old Boy to Kill His Parents and Two Classmates 
and Shoot and Injure 25 Others?” Frontline. PBS New York. Available: 








II. RESEARCH PROPOSAL 
A. CAN SCHOOL SHOOTINGS BE PREVENTED? 
Can institutions of higher learning better prepare to prevent and respond to school 
shootings and thus protect themselves from acts of extreme violence? How can the 
people, entities and institutions responsible for the safety and security of university and 
college campuses better work together to develop and implement policies to prepare, 
prevent, respond and survive these events? Are these findings applicable to larger 
communities? 
Secondary questions include: Do preparation and planning activities actually 
prevent acts of extreme violence on college campuses? What role should prevention, 
protection, response and resiliency activities (mental health services, crisis counseling, 
gun control legislation, training including “active shooter” training) have in reducing the 
significant impacts of incidents of extreme violence on college campuses?   
Tertiary questions include: What role do active shooter training and other types of 
advanced interdiction training for police, faculty, staff and students have in increasing 
survivability, organizational effectiveness and advancing the field of policing in the 21st 
century? 
B. PROBLEM SPACE: DEFINITIONS 
The Department of Homeland Security defines an active shooter as “an individual 
actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated 
area.”15  School shootings represent the largest single category of active shooter attacks  
 
 
                                                 




in the country.16 According to Jesse Klein, a school social worker, more than 500 
students and 150 adults including teachers, administrators, staff and parents have been 
killed in school shootings since 1969.17     
However, school shootings are still rare events.18 Many police leaders, educators 
and researchers take a very narrow view of school shootings by looking for better 
weapons, response tactics and singular solutions to complex problems that do not 
ameliorate the effects of these tragic events.19 “For every problem, there is a solution that 
is simple, neat and wrong.”20 After most school shootings, there is an immediate outcry 
for a direct and instantaneous response but very little sustained attention. To the extent 
that politicians, administrators, practitioners and researchers rely on media accounts of 
school shooting events for information and analysis, there is a proportionate likelihood 
that their conclusions will be skewed toward the sensational, inaccurate, and incomplete.    
The added challenge is that leaders of academic institutions seek to create an 
atmosphere of scholarly freedom and serenity and thus object to a noticeable presence of 
security features. University administrators are inadequately prepared to prevent and 
respond to these tragic events because they do not fully engage the entire arsenal of 
resources available to confront this threat: the academic community. This community 
consists of faculty, staff, students and police who create powerful networks for 
collaboration, information sharing, community policing strategies and interpersonal 
relationships. These community members can assist in identifying people who display a 
propensity towards violence and intercede, when appropriate, to diminish or deescalate 
situations conducive to escalating violence. In their role as first preventers and first 
                                                 
16 According to Kelly, 29% (64) of 224 active shooter cases studied between 1966 and 2010 were 
school shootings compared with shootings in office buildings, 13% (29), commercial settings, 23% (52), 
factory settings, 13% (30), and other locations, 22% (49). Of the 35 documented foiled attacks, 10 were 
school-shooting cases. 
17 Jesse Klein, The Bully Society: School Shootings and the Crisis in American Schools (New York 
and London: New York University Press, 2012). 
18 Glenn W Muschert, “Research in School Shootings,”  Sociology Compass 1–1 (Sept 2007): 60–80.  
19 Raymond W. Kelly, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs: 2004. 




responders, they can also provide much-needed intelligence to responding police officers 
in the event of an incident of extreme violence.21     
A central aim of this thesis is to discover, develop and understand the homeland 
security concepts and strategies that will help college and university communities prevent 
and, more importantly, survive campus shootings. The practical value of this research is 
to save lives, improve performance and relieve the devastating impacts of these events.  
This research will produce a resource guide not only for university stakeholders to 
improve university safety and security but also offer recommendations applicable to other 
educational environments, elementary schools, high schools and vocational schools, as 
well as larger communities such as towns and cities. It will assist in the development of 
policies, procedures and training imperatives to better prepare communities and 
governments to respond to potential threats including crime and other types of extreme 
violence. University officials will better understand their respective roles in preventing 
and responding to active shooters, as well as help them fulfill their moral obligation—and 
Clery Act requirements— to inform and protect students, faculty and staff and to identify 
and avoid dangerous, life-threatening situations. 
This research will contribute to the prevention of extreme school violence on 
college campuses due to a deeper and more meaningful understanding of extreme 
violence, aid in the identification of risk, and protect the university community while 
remaining consistent with pedagogical goals. 
The incidents of school shootings on college campuses can be prevented through 
the collaboration and application of whole-of-community concepts: Students, faculty, 
staff and police working together to prevent incidents of extreme violence on college 
campuses and responding more effectively and safely when they do occur. Police play a 
leading role in this engagement by training civilians to survive an active shooter attack. 
Police also play a key role in preventing extreme violence, preparing for it and training 
and preparing civilians to assist the police in the event of an attack. Civilians need to 
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know how to call police for help, program key information into their cell phones, and be 
taught what information is most useful to police:  Location, number of perpetrators, types 
of weapons, descriptions, direction of attack, etc. When police train active shooter 
techniques, they do so with the assent and assistance of community volunteers who 
participate and relay the information back to their communities. Two notable examples of 
community preparation include Run, Hide and Fight, and Have a Plan: Find Out, Get 
Out, Hide Out and Take Out.22 People need to have a plan to survive active shooter 
events and know what to expect, see, hear, and feel. Police also train civilians to save 
themselves so police can focus on eliminating the threat.   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Past research indicates that schools, particularly college campuses, are distinctly 
vulnerable to high casualty active shooter attacks. These types of attack will continue to 
be imminent hazards to individuals, institutions and communities (2IC) with devastating 
consequences until they are better understood by school administrators, community 
leaders and police commanders.  
School shootings have been studied from many divergent points of view, but there 
has been little effort to synthesize past studies or take a common methodological 
approach to orient future ones.23  
Through the examination of current literature and exploring the importance and 
relevance of training, information sharing and team work among the trilogy of key 
resources (2IC), we hope to ascertain important information in order to respond, survive 
and terminate school shootings. The literature about school shootings generally falls into 
four distinct categories: official policy documents, case studies, after-action reports and 
academic scholarship. 
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1. Official Policy Documents and Government Reports 
In 1999, The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) produced a report entitled: 
The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective.24  The purpose of the report was 
to develop threat assessment recommendations and prevention strategies designed to 
address the mental health of students likely to commit extreme school violence. The 
study was designed (intended) to examine specific cases of school shootings or foiled 
attempts in order to develop a better understanding of the perpetrator, incident, school 
and social dynamics. The FBI’s National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime 
(NCAVC) explored ideas presented during the gathering of 160 experts on the subject. 
The report does not state the backgrounds or other identifying information about the 
participants of this symposium “due to confidentiality issues.”25 It is therefore difficult to 
draw any conclusions as to their expertise, biases or other professional considerations that 
may impact this report. The report focused on 18 schools, 14 of which suffered shooting 
incidents and four of which had an attack averted by law enforcement engagement with 
the perpetrator. While the report is very careful to explain the limitations of other studies, 
it too falls victim to many of the same deficiencies. Drawing conclusions from an 
extremely small sample, making unsupported recommendations, and proffering 
unjustified claims are just a few of the problems of this report. The report also includes 
very little useful information about the averted attacks. 
The Bureau of Justice Statistics and International Association of Chiefs of Police 
collaborated on Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence,26 which 
provide hundreds of recommendations and suggestions for school administrators, 
teachers, parents and students to recognize indicators of extreme violence to help prevent 
them. Helpful suggestions are also provided for the police, media and community to 
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consider when assessing, planning and training for school crisis events and how to handle 
the aftermath of a crisis. Studies of actual cases are used to illustrate the potential value 
of these suggestions. The document provides a broad overview of issues, elements, and 
considerations, as well as the potential legal consequences for addressing the problem of 
school violence in order to help communities audit their schools’ existing policies, 
procedures and plans. Schools and communities could benefit from the intense 
collaboration recommended in this document. Collaborative school policies, plans and 
procedures that foster information sharing and written documentation can assist schools’ 
safety-planning activities to tailor policies to unique communities and circumstances.  
As comprehensive as this document is, it fails to address gun policy, a 
considerable omission, as well as the tactical and procedural issues associated with 
preventing and responding to extreme school violence.  
Prompted by several high-profile school shootings, the U.S. Secret Service and 
U.S. Department of Education collaborated on an endeavor to study cases of planned or 
targeted violence in schools. In Prior Knowledge of Potential School Based Violence: 
Information Students Learn May Prevent Attack, the authors focused on past incidents 
that were planned in advance to determine what could be done to prevent future attacks.27  
The study, known as the Safe School Initiative, focused on the operational conditions 
experienced by those involved in school safety to increase knowledge and improve 
prevention capabilities. Although released in 2008, the study examined 37 incidents of 
school violence involving 41 perpetrators between January 1974 and May 2000. The 
study found that in 93 percent of the cases the perpetrator exhibited concerning behavior 
prior to the attack, and in 81 percent of the cases a nonparticipant had some type of prior 
knowledge of the attacker’s plan. These results are difficult to interpret for several 
reasons. As we have experienced, connecting the dots after an event is quite easy. 
Identifying patterns and understanding the intricacies of relationships, social influences 
and community standards before an attack, however, is quite difficult. While this study  
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and the analysis of the resulting data is interesting, it does not offer prescriptive, specific 
recommendations that would allow administrators and law enforcement to identify 
genuine threats. 
These studies, taken together, establish the importance of developing meaningful 
social and emotional connections with 2IC: Individuals, institutions and communities 
including students, faculty, administrators, police officers and community members. 
Promotion of social, ethical and emotional connections encourages collaboration and 
information sharing.  
2. Case Studies 
Two studies of multiple active shooter cases were reviewed. The Brady Campaign 
to Prevent Gun Violence, Major School Shootings in the United States Since 1997, is a 
running history of school shootings that includes rampage shootings and targeted 
killings.28 The authors relied solely on media accounts of these shootings, which tend to 
be skewed toward the sensational, unbalanced and incomplete. This study included 
shootings of students shot off school property, which made the data difficult to compare 
to other studies. The study also included data derived from shootings that occurred in the 
vicinity of schools that did not have a nexus to schools, students or school administration. 
There is no shooting summary or analysis included in this document. This study is an 
exhaustive compendium of shooting incidents, some related to schools and others that are 
not.   
The other case study reviewed was the New York City Police Department Active 
Shooter Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation.29 This is a compendium of 
281 active shooter incidents that occurred between 1966 and 2010, drawn from open 
source data identified from Internet searches. The document includes a summary of 64 
school shootings. The NYPD included only incidents that met the DHS definition of an 
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active shooter event and further restricted this definition by eliminating gang-related 
violence, domestic assaults, robberies and drive-by shootings. There is a strong sampling 
bias in this report toward recent events for several reasons. Most prominently, the 
compendium was compiled in 2010 and failed to include many incidents that predated 
Internet news reporting. For shooting incidents that occurred between 2000 and 2010, the 
compendium is almost complete. For attacks before this period, the case studies reported 
are biased toward events with higher numbers of killed and wounded that attracted more 
media attention. The report is also heavily biased toward events that occurred in English-
speaking countries, or ones that were sensational enough to have been reported from non-
English-speaking countries on English-language Internet sites. The NYPD restricted 
quantitative analysis to cases that occurred in the U.S., and had one or more documented 
dead casualties. An added deficiency of this report is its lack of critical analysis. Despite 
these shortcomings, this report is thorough, complete and well documented.         
3. After Action Reports and Strategy Papers 
Although Columbine is often referred to as the most widely written about school 
shooting in U.S. history, two of the most thorough after action reports occurred after the 
Virginia Tech shootings. These include reports directed by the president of the United 
States30 and another directed by the governor of Virginia.31 
Report to the President on Issues Raised by the Virginia Tech Tragedy 
summarizes the results of official interviews and meetings with educators, mental health 
experts, law enforcement and other key representatives in 12 states. The major recurring 
themes reported in this report include: improving information sharing, advancing gun 
control legislation, enhancing mental health services and more thoroughly developing 
emergency preparedness procedures. The report encourages an ongoing national dialogue 
to address these issues in order to minimize the risk to school safety. While focusing on 
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the federal response to local school shootings, Report to the President provides keen 
insight and information for state, local and tribal community leaders to navigate the 
sometimes confusing and risk-averse complexities of the federal government. The report 
includes examples of how federal resources are available to address local issues, 
including clarification from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services about the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) guidelines, information about Center for 
Disease Control (CDC) resources including “Project Respect” to build healthy school 
climates and prevent school violence, and information about the resources of Alcohol, 
Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF) to provide critical information about persons 
banned from gun ownership. The report does not explain its methodology, how to access 
training resources or other important tactical resources related to school violence. Like 
the 1999 FBI report, Report to the President does not include an explanation or index of 
the interview subjects, making it difficult, if not impossible, to assess whether or not 
these people are experts in the field for which they offered opinions, recommendations 
and guidance. 
The Virginia Tech Review Panel’s report, Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech on the 
other hand includes an extensive list of authorities, sources and references. The 
painstaking detail is evident in mental health histories, campus maps, sketches and 
drawings. Interviews are summarized in detail with the subject’s background, expertise 
and experience clearly articulated. Technology that existed at the time of the attack is 
thoroughly detailed and explained. Primary sources are cited, sourced and provided in an 
appendix. The panel used a revised methodology to capture confidential information, 
provide expert opinions on issues relating to privacy, record keeping, public meeting 
protocols and the authorization to meet in closed session. The report includes a summary 
of key findings and recommendations, background and scope, university setting, campus 
environment and security. The university’s police department’s mission statement, 
staffing, training, campus alerting systems and emergency response plans are summarized 




4. Academic Scholarship and Research 
In Research in School Shootings, Glenn W. Muschert from Miami University in 
Oxford, Ohio studies school shootings from a multidisciplinary perspective.32 Mr. 
Muschert contends that to date there is no unified body of knowledge that examines 
extreme violence on school campuses. His article proposes a typology from which to 
study school shootings, examines the media’s propensity to sensationalize such events 
and examines the 2IC dynamics at various social levels. While Mr. Muschert contends 
school shootings have occurred at a relatively steady rate over time, he offers no evidence 
to support this conclusion. He also contends that school shootings contribute to the 
general impression that school shootings are an emerging and increasing social problem, 
but he again offers no evidence in support of this conclusion.      
In School Shootings as Organizational Deviance, Cybelle Fox and David J. 
Harding argue that rampage school shootings can be understood in the context of 
organizational deviance.33  Organizational deviance, a concept originally proposed by 
Diane Vaughan in her study of the culture of NASA before the Challenger disaster, 
occurs when events created by an organization do not conform to an organization’s goals 
or expectations and produce unanticipated outcomes.34 It is often an unintended 
consequence of the normal activities of people within an organization. In studying the 
events that led to the Challenger’s ill-fated final launch, for example, Ms. Vaughan 
credited the failure of information sharing among the various decision makers within the 
organization as a key factor that led to organizational deviance. Drawing on data from 
two case studies of schools that experienced shootings, the authors of School Shootings 
demonstrate how the structure, environment, and culture of these schools led to the loss 
of information sharing about socially and/or emotionally troubled students that may have 
led to some form of intervention. 
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A fascinating study, the authors omitted several key factors necessary for extreme 
violence to take place in schools. One of the more important variables in determining the 
relationship between schools and violence is the role police and authority figures play in 
creating a safe environment. Other factors include emergency and crisis planning 
activities, a commitment to preparedness, and the designation of a person in charge of 
emergency activities. Another deficiency in this study is its inherent lack of consistency 
in approach. Despite the authors’ stated intention to identify the key elements of 
organization deviance that contribute to school shootings there were too many variables 
to consider:  
Our goal is to understand whether ideas that were developed or invoked to 
understand white-collar crime, manmade disasters, or the decision to 
launch the Challenger, such as structural secrecy, loosely and tightly 
coupled systems, organizational environment, role strain, routine signals, 
and organizational culture (among others), can help us to understand why 
schools fail to identify certain youths with social or emotional problems.35 
Studying rare events, such as school shootings also presents methodological 
challenges.36 One particular problem is the selection of comparison cases. Without a 
common theoretical perspective and prior knowledge of which factors will be identified 
as important, selecting comparison cases is all but impossible. 
D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The literature review identified important and relevant topics and sources of 
information about school shootings. 
Scholars from a variety of disciplines have studied campus crime and safety. 
School shootings, however, receive widespread media attention after an event but very  
little sustained attention afterwards. Academic attention has been minimal with the 
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exceptions noted and the work of a few researchers discussed in subsequent chapters of 
this thesis.  
This literature review clearly demonstrates the need for additional research. The 
homeland security enterprise as an academic discipline has tremendous potential to use 
its collaborative framework and multi-dimensional lens to dramatically improve the 
knowledge and understanding of these devastating attacks of extreme violence. Since the 
homeland security enterprise was created in 2002, school shootings have received 
considerably more attention and increasingly better understanding.    
School shootings have been studied from many divergent points of view but there 
has been little effort to synthesize past studies or orient future ones.37 Understanding the 
varieties of school shootings—rampages, mass murder, terrorist attack, targeted attack, 
and government shootings—is an integral first step to determining what can be done to 
prevent, terminate and recover from extreme school violence and increase the likelihood 
of victim survival.  
E. RESEARCH METHODS: COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES 
Extreme violence in educational environments can be prevented and safety on 
college campuses can be improved. This research will provide an evaluative analysis of 
recent case studies and the devastating consequences of extreme violence at Virginia 
Tech and Northern Illinois University. It will also provide several examples and analysis 
of international terrorist events that occurred in educational environments.  
The case studies will examine the personal histories and pathologies of the 
perpetrators, university environments, and official and unofficial interactions with 
students, faculty and staff. They will look at how these interactions may influence 
collaboration and information sharing and the willingness of individuals to share 
sensitive and pertinent information across sectors and report suspicious, unusual and 
dangerous behavior to people who have the authority and responsibility to take action. 
                                                 




This study will also comparatively examine foreign incidents of major mass 
casualty school shootings. Despite various cross-cultural differences, modern educational 
environments share common features in key social, cultural and educational respects 
across major societies that are central to this study of prevention. In many important 
ways, school shootings in Israel and Russia are described as terrorist events because they 
targeted school children for ideological reasons, offer important lesson to inform 
planning and response techniques in America. The 1974 Ma’alot Massacre in Israel, 
which resulted in the deaths of 25 hostages, and the 2004 Beslan Massacre in North 
Ossetia, which killed 334 hostages, are included for responders to understand the 
consequences of such events. The domestic and international case studies together 
examine planning and coordination, training and equipment, communications, 
intelligence and information sharing, and legal and policy issues, not only in terms of the 
human capital needed to support these endeavors but also in terms of the costs associated 










III. THE HISTORY OF EXTREME VIOLENCE IN 
EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION TO EXTREME VIOLENCE AS A DYNAMIC EVENT 
Incidents of extreme violence in educational environments are dynamic events 
that vary greatly. In most cases of extreme violence on college campuses, perpetrators 
use firearms, and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims.38  The best 
type of response for victims, witnesses, community members, university leaders and 
police officials depends greatly on the unique circumstances and characteristics of the 
event. Because school shootings are dynamic events, there is no single set of best 
practices that can be described. However, there are clearly recognizable indicators and 
recommendations that can significantly increase survivability, mitigate risk and inform 
response interdiction. Understanding the history of these events increases our 
understanding and may illuminate a pathway to safety and security by identifying 
underlying pathologies, conditions and techniques that link these devastating events.  
B. TYPOLOGY OF SCHOOL SHOOTINGS 
School shootings have been studied from many divergent points of view but there 
has been very little effort to synthesize past studies or orient future ones.39 Understanding 
the variety of school shootings rampages, mass murder, terrorist attack, targeted killings 
and government shootings is an integral first step to determining what can be done to 
prevent, terminate and recover from extreme school violence.40  While violence is the 
essential component of each type of incident, and firearms the overwhelmingly popular 
weapon of choice, explosives are commonly used in conjunction with firearms and 
sometimes, although rarely, explosives are used exclusively.  
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1. Rampage Shootings 
Rampage shootings are expressive, non-targeted attacks, usually committed by a 
former member of the school or community.41  Victims are targeted either at random or 
for their symbolic value, not as individuals.42 Power, revenge and anger are all 
motivations for the rampage shooter. Many shooters equate the school with the 
community, and therefore, an attack on a school is seen by the shooter as an attack on the 
community. Mr. McGhee and Ms. DeBernardo refer to these shooters as “avengers.”  
They seek revenge for a perceived or actual slight or insult to themselves and/or to the 
group or class they represent. While most rampage shootings occur at primary or 
secondary schools, college and universities are not immune. The killings at the University 
of Texas in 1966, at Virginia Tech in 2007, and at Northern Illinois University in 2008 
are all examples of rampage shootings. Rampage shootings are terroristic in nature 
because they create fear and confusion across a broad spectrum of individuals, 
institutions and communities.  
2. Mass Murders 
School-related mass murders are typically carried out by an individual who 
targets categories of individuals selected for their symbolic importance or the school in 
general. Power, revenge and a displaced sense of loyalty are motivations for school-
related mass murders.43  The worst incident of school violence in U.S. history falls into 
this category, although it was not a shooting. In 1927, motivated by revenge for a new 
school tax in Bath, Michigan, school board treasurer, Andrew Kehoe, killed his wife,44 
blew up all of the buildings on his farm and detonated explosives under a school building, 
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killing 45 people and injuring 58.45  In 1989, Marc Lepine, an engineering student at 
Ecole Politechnique de Montreal, Canada entered a classroom, claimed he hated 
feminists, segregated the men from the women, and shot the women, killing six.46  In 
1996, Thomas Hamilton, a local shopkeeper, entered the Dublane Middle School in 
Dublane, Scotland and killed 17 people, including 16 children and their teacher.47   In 
October 2006, Charles Roberts, a milk truck driver “angry at God” shot 10 Amish girls, 
killing 5, at the West Nickel Mines Amish School, a one-room school house in Lancaster 
County Pennsylvania.48  
3. Terrorist Attacks 
Terrorist attacks at school institutions are the third category of incidents of 
extreme violence at schools. Schools and children are selected by terrorists as symbolic 
targets because of their perceived importance in communities. These attacks are 
motivated politically or ideologically. Two noteworthy examples of terrorist attacks at 
school institutions described at length later in this thesis are the 1974 incident at Ma’alot, 
Israel where three Palestinian terrorists murdered 25 people, including 21 children at the 
Netiv Meir elementary school.49  The 2004 incident at Beslan, Russia is another example 
of a terrorist attack at a school that left 344 people dead including 186 children.50  
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4. Targeted Attacks 
Targeted attacks are the fourth and largest category of shooting instances at 
schools, although they rarely receive the national media attention of the other types of 
school attacks. Targeted attacks are described as shooting instances that are conducted by 
a member or former member of the school community who specifically attacks 
individuals or specific groups of individuals in order to exact revenge for a perceived or 
actual grievance or mistreatment. Unlike the other types of attack, they are not symbolic 
but are motivated by revenge and generally are not focused on the entire school. In 1992, 
Joseph White shot and killed Delondyn Lawson at the Tilden School in Chicago and in 
2003 James Sheets, 14, shot the school principal, Eugene Sergo, in Red Lion, 
Pennsylvania, resulting in Mr. Sergio’s death. Mr. Sheets then killed himself.51 
5. Government Provoked Violence  
The fifth type of school violence involves government agents who are attempting 
to restore peace or quell civil unrest. Incidents of school violence in response to student 
protests include the 1968 anti-segregation protest at South Carolina State University that 
left three dead , and two anti-war demonstrations: The 1970 Kent State University protest 
that killed four and the Jackson State College shootings two weeks later where two 
people were killed.52 
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Table 1.   Compendium of Selected Cases 1853–201253 
Date Place Outcome 
November 2, 1853 Louisville, Kentucky First recorded school shooting, 
student shoots and kills 
headmaster to avenge his 
brothers honor, shooter 
survives 
April  9, 1891 St. Mary’s School, Newburgh, 
New York 
First recorded mass shooting, 
70 year old male unaffiliated 
with school, opens fire on a 
group of elementary school 
children, no deaths, numerous 
injuries, shooter survives 
May 18, 1927 Bath Consolidated School, 
Bath, Michigan 
Deadliest mass murder, School 
Board Treasurer kills 42 in  
domestic terrorist IED attack, 
terrorist dies 
August 1, 1966 University of Texas, Austin, 
Texas 
Graduate student kills 16 and 
injures 32, shooter dies 
December 30, 1974 Olean High School, Olean, 
New York 
Student kills 3 and injures 11, 
shooter survives 
July 12, 1976 University of California, 
Fullerton 
Staff member kills 7 and 
injures 2, shooter survives 
January 29, 1979 Cleveland Elementary School, 
Stockton, California 
First female shooter, 
unaffiliated with school, kills 
2 and injures 9, shooter 
survives 
April 7, 1982 Deer Creek Junior High 
School, Littleton, Colorado 
14 year old student 
intentionally kills another 
student while shooting prairie 
dogs on school grounds, 
shooter survives 
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Date Place Outcome 
May 16, 1986 Cokeville Elementary School, 
Sweetwater County, Wyoming 
Unaffiliated couple take 167 
students and teachers hostage, 
demand ransom, accidentally 
detonate IED, 70 injuries, 
perpetrators die: 
murder/suicide  
January 17, 1989 Cleveland Elementary School, 
Stockton, California 
Unaffiliated male, 26, kills 5 
and injures 34, shooter dies 
suicide 
February 2, 1996 Frontier Middle School, 
Moses Lake, Washington 
Student kills 3, survives 
December 1, 1997 Heath High School, West 
Paducah, Kentucky 
Student kills 3 and injures 5, 
shooter survives 
March 4, 1998 Westside Middle School, 
Jonesboro, Arkansas 
2 Students kill 5 and injure 10, 
shooters survive 
May 21, 1998 Thurston High School, 
Springfield, Oregon 
Student kills parents and 2 
students, injures 35, shooter 
survives 
April 20, 1999 Columbine High School, 
Littleton, Colorado  
2 students kill 13, injure 21, 
shooters die: suicide 
January 16, 2002 Appalachian School of Law, 
Grundy, Virginia 
Student kills 3, injures 3, 
shooter survives 
October 29, 2002 University of Arizona, 
Tucson, Arizona 
Student kills 3 professors, 
shooter dies, suicide 
March 21, 2005 Red Lake High School, Red 
Lake, Minnesota 
Student killed both 
grandparents and 7 students, 
shooter dies: suicide 
October 2, 2006 School House Lancaster 
County Pennsylvania 
Unaffiliated male kills 5 and 
wounds 5 shooter dies: suicide  
April 16, 2007 Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, 
Virginia 
Student kills 32 and injures 
20, shooter dies: suicide 
December 7, 2007 Youth with a Mission Training 
Center, Arvada, Colorado & 
New Life Church, Colorado 
Springs, Colorado 
Unaffiliated male kills 4, 
injures 5, in two separate 
shootings, engages in gun 
battle after second shooting 
with security guard and finally 
kills himself 
February 14, 2008 Northern Illinois University, 
DeKalb, Illinois  
Former student kills 5 injures 
20, shooter dies: suicide 
February 10, 2012 University of Alabama, 
Huntsville, Alabama 
Professor kills 3 injures 3, 
shooter survives 
February 23, 2010 Deer Creek Middle School, 
Littleton, Colorado 
Unaffiliated male shoots 2 and 
is subdued by teacher, shooter 
survives 








killing 3, shooter survives  
Outcome 
April 2, 2012 Oikos University, Oakland, 
California 
Former student kills 7 and 
injures 3, shooter survives 
December 14, 2012 Sandy Hook Elementary 
School, Newtown, 
Connecticut 
Unaffiliated male, 20, kills his 
mother and 26 students and 
faculty, shooter dies suicide 
 
It is important to note that the case studies examined in this thesis are hardly 
isolated events. Violence in educational environments unfortunately has a long history in 
America. The following incidents of extreme violence in educational environments were 
selected for notable characteristics, such as type and level of violence, number of 
casualties, the identity of the offender, as well as weapons and/or techniques. The 
common details of these shootings underscore the fact that preparation for these 
devastating events may actually improve the opportunities for preventing them from 
occurring in the first place.  
Scholars from a variety of disciplines have studied campus crime and safety. 
School shootings receive widespread media attention immediately after an event, but they 
receive very little sustained academic attention afterwards.54   
Organized chronologically, these cases represent significant incidents of extreme 
violence in educational environments. The analysis of these cases found a large degree of 
variation across broad categories in terms of description and type of perpetrator, 
motivation, planning tactics, targets, intent and number of casualties.  
The first school shooting recorded in America was on Wednesday, November 2, 
1853, in Louisville, Kentucky, when Matt Ward, a student, brought a single-shot pistol to 
school demanding that the headmaster, Professor Butler, apologize for calling his brother, 
William Ward, a liar the day before.55  Professor Butler refused, a struggle ensued, Ward 
fired once and Butler collapsed and died in his office. Mr. Ward was acquitted of the  
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murder of the headmaster after a lengthy public trial. Published reports at the time 
indicated that the judge believed Mr. Ward’s brother’s honor was at stake, and he was not 
convinced the shooting was not an accident. 
The first recorded mass shooting of school children occurred on Thursday, April 
9, 1891, in Newburgh, New York when 70-year-old, James H. Ferguson, described as 
demented, opened fire with a shotgun into a group of school children playing in front of 
St Mary’s School. No children were killed “although several were well filled with lead” 
according to the New York Times account of the incident.56 Mr. Ferguson was 
institutionalized.  
The deadliest mass murder in an educational environment in our nation’s history 
took place on Wednesday, May 18, 1927, in Bath, Michigan when Andrew Kehoe, 55, 
killed 42 people, mostly children. It is also the first recorded instance of politically 
inspired terrorism at a school. Andrew Kehoe was the School Board’s Treasurer and was 
upset due to a recent school tax increase. After killing his wife at home, Kehoe detonated 
fire bombs throughout his farm, destroying every building. Kehoe then blew up the Bath 
Consolidated School, killing 38 people. Kehoe had planned the attack for weeks, 
meticulously wiring over 1000 pounds of dynamite beneath the school. Surprisingly, only 
one shot was fired at the school that day by Kehoe and that was to trigger a truck bomb 
that he had configured in a suicide attack to kill the Superintendent of Schools Emory B. 
Huyck and other first responders, who were in front of the school trying to rescue 
victims. Mr. Huyck, Mr. Kehoe and two rescuers were killed.57        
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Extreme violence in educational environments continued unabated through the 
1930s, 1940s and 1950s with 12 to 15 school shootings per decade, each with at least one 
injury and often at least one death.  
The following compendium includes only mass murders, defined as the death of 
three or more individuals not including the perpetrator, and other notable cases 
highlighted for the reasons indicated, that occurred in educational environments in the 
United States since 1960. 
On Monday, August 1, 1966, Charles Whitman, 25, a former Marine and graduate 
student at the University of Texas, Austin, perpetrated one of the most notorious school 
shootings in our nation’s history. After killing his mother and wife, he packed three rifles, 
a shotgun and three pistols and hundreds of rounds of ammunition into a foot locker that 
he carried to the observation deck atop the University’s Observation Tower. He used the 
foot locker to barricade himself from police. Some of the weapons he was about to use he 
had purchased that very morning. He then systematically shot and killed 16 people and 
wounded 32 others over the next 96 minutes. As a small fixed wing, single engine 
airplane with a police officer on board provided air cover, Whitman was finally killed by 
two police officers and an armed civilian who stormed his fortress-like perch.58    
Although the 1970s had relatively few reported school shootings, three of the four 
reported events were notable.  
On Monday, December 30, 1974, 60 miles south of Buffalo, not far from the 
Pennsylvania border in upstate, Olean, New York, Anthony Barbaro, 17, a senior honors 
student and rifle team member, entered Olean High School, which was closed for the 
Christmas holidays. From a position on the third floor, he systematically shot 14 people, 
killing three who were walking in front of the school.59  Despite a gas mask he had worn, 
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Barbaro was rendered unconscious by tear gas and taken into custody.60  He was tried 
and convicted and remains in prison. On Monday, July 12, 1976, Edward Charles 
Allaway, 37, a custodian at the University of California at Fullerton who was upset about 
the proliferation of pornography and suspected  that his former wife was involved, armed 
himself with a semiautomatic rifle, killed seven people and wounded two others in the 
school’s library where he worked.61   Allaway fled in an automobile and surrendered to 
police several miles away. Allaway claimed an insanity defense and the judge agreed.62  
Allaway is confined to Patton State Hospital in San Bernardino, California, a mental 
institution, and has sought and been denied parole five times since becoming eligible in 
1991. 
Men are by far the predominate perpetrators of extreme violence in educational 
environments but in a rare school shooting incident, a female, Brenda Ann Spencer, 16, 
shot and killed the school principal and a custodian and wounded nine children and a 
police officer on Monday, January 29, 1979, at Cleveland Elementary School in 
Stockton, California in the state’s central valley. When Ms. Spencer, the first female 
school shooter in recorded history, was asked why she had done this, she is reported to 
have said “I don’t like Mondays” and thus inspired the song “I Don’t Like Mondays” by 
the Boomtown Rats, which is about school shootings.63 She is currently incarcerated in 
the California Institution for Women. 
An analysis of the historical data about extreme violence in educational 
environments acquired through Internet searches, media and governmental reports 
suggests a strong sampling bias toward sensational events. Single casualty events tend to 
be of only local interest while multiple casualty events attract national media attention. 
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While this phenomenon is discussed in further detail later in this thesis, the advent of 
high capacity magazines and the proliferation of semiautomatic weapons are largely 
responsible for multiple casualties and the resulting national media focus. Also while data 
collection techniques for extreme violence in educational settings prior to 1992 were 
limited,64 sensational media reports in the early 1970s may have focused primarily on 
news reports concerning the controversial war in Vietnam and the sometimes equally 
disturbing demonstrations supporting the end of this war. Another reason for this lack of 
focus on school shootings may have been that the media was preoccupied with other 
sensational violence, specifically serial murders like the Son of Sam shootings—
perpetrated by David Berkowitz—and the Ted Bundy killings.   
Ted Bundy is loosely affiliated with this area of investigation because of his 
confessed involvement with as many as 30 murders and numerous assaults of high school 
and college women between 1971 and his apprehension in 1978. Some of these killings 
had a nexus to educational environments, particularly the double bludgeoning homicides 
and multiple assaults at Florida State University and various murders of high school and 
college students in Colorado, Oregon and Washington State.65 Several hundred 
spectators gathered to celebrate Mr. Bundy’s death by execution on January 24, 1989. 
The 1980s experienced an increase in the level of violence and a new element in 
extreme school violence: hostage-taking. 
In 1982 Littleton, Colorado experienced its first, but certainly not its last school 
shooting incident on Wednesday, April 7, 1982, when 14-year-old Jason Rocha shot 13-
year-old Scott Darwin Michael.66 The boys were shooting prairie dogs on the grounds of 
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Deer Creek Junior High School when Rocha suddenly turned the gun on his friend.67   
Rocha, tried as an adult, was convicted of killing his friend and served 12 years in prison. 
On Tuesday, November 26, 1985, in Spanaway, Washington, 14-year-old Heather 
Smith brought a rifle to school and waited outside of the school gymnasium for the boy 
who had earlier that day broken up with her. When Gordon Picket, also 14, and his friend 
Joe Begay, 14, exited the school she shot and killed both of them but fled before police 
arrived. She returned to the school several hours later still carrying the rifle and, as the 
police approached her, she shot herself in the head and later died at the hospital.68  
On Friday, May 16, 1986, David Young, a former town marshal and self-
described “revolutionist” and his wife Doris “Dorsie” Young, armed with a manifesto, a 
gun and a shopping cart filled with homemade explosives, entered the Cokeville 
Elementary School in Sweetwater County, Wyoming. Mr. Young delivered his manifesto 
to the school principal and his wife lured everyone into one room. Together they took 
167 students and teachers hostage. Mr. Young demanded a ransom of “$2 million dollars 
per student” roughly $300 million dollars, and an audience with President Reagan. After 
90 minutes, Ms. Young accidently detonated the bomb when Mr. Young was out of the 
room. Mr. Young returned to the room and shot a teacher, John Miller, who was helping 
children escape. Mr. Young then shot and killed his wife and then fatally turned the gun 
on himself. All of the hostages escaped but 70 children were wounded in the blast. The 
incident inspired a book When Angels Intervene, by Hartt Wixom and Judene Wixom, 
and a 1994 television movie To Save the Children.69  
Cleveland Elementary School in Stockton, California, was once again the scene of 
another horrific act of extreme school violence in 1989. On Tuesday, January 17, twelve 
days before the 10th anniversary of Brenda Spencer’s Monday Morning murders at the 
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elementary school, Patrick Edward Purdy, 26, a career criminal and an unemployed 
drifter, used a high-powered semiautomatic rifle to shoot a teacher and 34 school 
children, killing five of the children.70  This shooting triggered the enactment of the 
Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act of 1989 in California.71  This act banned 
over 50 specific firearms including several types of rifles, shotguns and hand guns.72  
After most acts of extreme violence involving firearms, there is a call for gun legislation; 
this subject will be explored more thoroughly in a later chapter of this thesis. 
The 1990s brought the advent of better reporting, enhanced analysis and improved 
data collection to school shootings. The National School Safety Center (NSSC), although 
created in 1984, began fulfilling this vital role in 1992. Beginning in 1992, The National 
School Safety Center was the first organization to focus specifically on school-related 
deaths, as well as to define and categorize school shootings. NSSC defines a school-
associated violent death as any homicide, suicide or weapons-related violent death in 
which a fatal injury occurs in the United States.73  The NSSC also defines school 
property, school sessions, official functions and the incidents nexus to the institution. It is 
interesting to note that, to date, the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence has 
demonstrated no sustained attention or provided any analysis of school shootings other 
than to compile a compendium of loosely related media accounts of incidents described 
as school shootings. The list includes many shootings that have no obvious nexus to 
schools and many that are gang related and occurred well after school hours. This makes 
thoughtful analysis of the data virtually impossible.    
While media attention may have resulted in better reporting of school shooting 
incidents, data from the late ‘90s reveals a dramatic increase in the number of mass 
murders in educational environments. High capacity magazines and the prevalence of 
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semiautomatic weapons are two important reasons for the increased casualty counts. 
Other reasons may include national media attention and better reporting mechanisms, 
such as the NSSC, and the advent of the Internet. 
On Friday, February 2, 1996, 180 miles east of Seattle in Moses Lake, 
Washington, 14-year-old honors student Barry Loukaitis thought it would be “pretty 
cool” to go on a murderous rampage like the two main characters in the movie “Natural 
Born Killers.”74  Loukaitis, armed with three firearms taken from his family’s home, 
walked into Frontier Middle School where he was a student and killed his algebra teacher 
and two fellow students in class. Loukaitus was tried as an adult and sentenced to two life 
terms of imprisonment plus 205 years. He is currently in the Callum Bay Corrections 
Center in Washington State. 
On Monday, December 1, 1997, in West Paducah, Kentucky, three girls were 
killed and five others wounded when 14-year-old Michael Carneal opened fire on a 
prayer group meeting at Heath High School.75 Carneal pled guilty by reason of mental 
illness and is serving a 25-year sentence in the custody of the Kentucky Department of 
Corrections. He is eligible for parole in 2023.  
On Tuesday, March 24, 1998, at the Westside Middle School in Jonesboro, 
Arkansas, Mitchell Johnson, 13, “a hunter from an early age”76 and Andrew Golden, 13, 
described as an “expert marksman,” killed four students and a teacher and wounded 10 
others after they pulled the school’s fire alarm and waited in the nearby woods for 
faculty, staff and students to evacuate the school and began shooting.77 Described as the 
worst middle school mass murder in our nation’s history, Johnson and Golden are among 
the youngest children ever charged with murder. Both boys were tried as juveniles, found 
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guilty and received maximum sentences. Both were released on their 21st birthdays and 
Johnson has repeatedly run afoul of the law since. Johnson has been arrested on federal 
and state weapons charges and has been in and out of jail on numerous occasions.78   
On Thursday, May 21, 1998 in Springfield, Oregon, Kipland “Kip” Kinkel, a 15-
year-old with a history of mental illness and aggressive behavior, armed himself with two 
knives, three guns and over 1000 rounds of ammunition and fired 48 rounds in Thurston 
High School’s crowded school cafeteria, killing two students and wounding 35 others 
with a gun purchased for him by his parents. Kinkel used the same gun to kill his parents 
on May 20.79 Kinkel, a popular student and member of the football team, admitted his 
guilt and was sentenced to 111 years in prison without the possibility of parole. 
Then in 1999, one of the most notorious and most referenced school shootings in 
our nation’s history:  Columbine.  
The Columbine High School Massacre occurred on Tuesday, April 20, 1999, near 
Littleton, Colorado in an unincorporated area of Jefferson County. Informed by many of 
the previous school shootings, particularly Kip Kinkel’s deadly rampage in Springfield, 
Oregon, Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris, both 18 years old and seniors at Columbine, 
murdered 12 classmates and a teacher and shot 21 others after a year of planning, 
preparation and copious note-taking.80  It was only by sheer luck, incompetence and 
circumstance that Mr. Klebold and Mr. Harris did reach Mr. Klebold’s stated goal of 
inflicting “the most deaths in U.S. history.”81  Originally planned primarily as a bombing, 
it was only after the propane bombs they assembled failed to detonate that Mr. Harris and 
Mr. Klebold launched their deadly fusillade of bullets. The FBI reported that the bombs 
alone could have killed 600 students in the cafeteria at the time. The FBI concluded that 
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Eric Harris, with a history of mental illness, was the motivating force behind this 
devastating attack. He was described in the FBI’s report as a “sociopath” who wrote 
about crashing planes into New York City. Columbine was the fourth-deadliest school 
massacre in U.S. history after the 1927 Bath School bombing, 2007 Virginia Tech 
killings and 1966 University of Texas murders.  
According to the National School Safety Center, the last decade of the 20th 
century recorded 240 school-related murders.82 
The first mass murder in an educational environment of the new millennium in 
the United States was reported on Wednesday, January 16, 2002, when a recently 
dismissed law student, Peter Odighizuwa, described as a “time bomb waiting to go off,” 
opened fire with a .380 caliber semiautomatic pistol at Appalachian School of Law in 
Grundy, Virginia, killing three and wounding three others.83 When the 43-year-old 
Nigerian left the building where the shootings took place, he was subdued by students. 
Mr. Odighizuwa was determined to be incompetent to stand trial. After three years of 
treatment, he pled guilty to the murders and was sentenced to three life sentences plus 28 
years. He is not eligible for parole. 
On Tuesday, October 29, 2002, Robert Flores, a nursing student at the University 
of Arizona in Tucson and a Persian Gulf War veteran described as an expert marksman, 
armed himself with five handguns and 200 rounds of ammunition and killed three of his 
professors who had given him failing grades before killing himself.84 
On Monday, March 21, 2005, Jeff Weise, 16, a student at Red Lake High School 
on the Chipewa Indian reservation in Red Lake, Minnesota, killed his grandparents and 
then went to school that day with three handguns. He killed seven fellow students. The 
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rampage shooting continued for 10 minutes with students pleading with the gunman to 
stop before the shooter committed suicide.85 
On Monday, October 2, 2006, Charles Carl Roberts IV, a truck driver “angry at 
God” armed with a rifle, shotgun and handgun and 200 rounds of ammunition, entered a 
one-room school house in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. He ordered the teacher, 
several parents and 15 male students to leave the building. He told the 11 female students 
to line up against the blackboard. When troopers arrived he became agitated and 
demanded they leave the property immediately. When they hesitated, he immediately 
began shooting the young girls, killing five and wounding five others in the third school 
shooting in six days.86 When police were finally able to enter the barricaded school, 
Roberts killed himself.  
On Monday, April 16, 2007, Seung-Hui Cho, a student armed with two hand 
guns, killed 32 people and wounded 20 others on the campus of Virginia Tech.87  The 
incident was a multiple location assault scenario committed by a lone gunman 
representing a well-planned, coordinated and executed attack. Cho killed himself before 
being engaged by the police. Lessons from this incident are applicable to the prevention 
and response of school violence in educational environments. This incident is described 
and analyzed in detail in a subsequent chapter of this thesis. 
On Friday, December 7, 2007, Mathew Murray, 24, killed two people and injured 
two others at a missionary school in Arvada, Colorado. Twelve hours later he then 
walked into the New Life Church in Colorado Springs 70 miles away and fatally shot two 
more people and injured three others, before he was shot by a woman who volunteered at 
the church.88 He later died of a self-inflicted gunshot wound. 
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On Thursday, February 14, 2008, Steven Kazmierczak, a former graduate student 
at Northern Illinois University, opened fire in a university lecture hall, killing five people 
and injuring more than 20.89 Kazmierczak killed himself prior to the arrival of police. 
Lessons from this event are illustrative because the perpetrator had an extensive prior 
history of mental illness that appeared to be in remission for several years. He was 
described by faculty as benevolent. A few months before the attack, he appeared to close 
friends to be unraveling. This incident will be summarized and analyzed in detail in a 
subsequent chapter of this thesis and was the fourth school shooting within a one-week 
period.90  
On Wednesday, February 10, 2010, Amy Bishop, a biology professor at the 
University of Alabama in Huntsville with a doctoral degree from Harvard University, 
opened fire during a faculty meeting, killing three people and injuring three others. Five 
of the victims were other faculty members.91  Ms. Bishop had previously been denied 
tenure at the university. This was not the professor’s first killing. In 1986, after a family 
argument, she shot and killed her brother, claiming it was an accident. She fled the home 
and was found by police several miles from the scene still carrying the weapon. Bishop 
was also questioned in an attempted bomb plot.92  After admitting her guilt, Bishop was 
still required to stand trial. The proceedings lasted for 20 minutes before the jury found 
her guilty. She was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.  
On Tuesday, February 23, 2010, Littleton, Colorado was again the location for a 
third school shooting and the second at Deer Creek Middle School when a 32-year-old 
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male, Bruco Strong Eagle Eastwood, who was earlier seen walking around the school and 
later found to have been planting ammunition around the school for later use, opened fire 
with a rifle in the parking lot and injured two students. He was tackled by David Benke, a 
teacher, who held him until police arrived.93  Eastwood was found not guilty by reason of 
insanity of attempted first degree murder but was found guilty of weapons possession. He 
will stay in a state mental hospital until declared sane.94 
On Tuesday, December 14, 2010, Clay Duke, an ex-convict with an attitude and a 
gun, who claimed his wife was unfairly fired from the Panama City, Florida school 
district, attended a public school board meeting. During the sparsely attended meeting, 
Mr. Duke got up to speak and began brandishing a gun. As Mr. Duke spoke and moved 
menacingly around the room, Ginger Littleton, a middle-aged school board member, 
approached the gunman from behind and attempted to disarm him as the other hostages 
sat idly by. Mr. Duke knocked Ms. Littleton to the floor and fired several shots at the 
school board members but missed them. When the police attempted to engage Mr. Duke, 
he killed himself. The entire incident was caught on video.95 
On Monday, February 27, 2012, Thomas M. Lane III, a 17 year old former 
student at Chardon High School in Chardon, Ohio entered the school cafeteria at 7:30 
a.m. armed with a .22 caliber hand gun and began shooting. Lane shot 5 students, three of 
whom later died. He was chased into a wooded area and apprehended by two teachers. 
The shooter is alleged to have posted warnings of his impending act on Twitter.96 
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On Monday, April 2, 2012, One L. Goh, 43, a former student at Oikos University, 
a small Christian school of nursing college in Oakland, California, killed seven people 
and injured three. Mr. Goh had previously been expelled from the school for poor 
performance. About 35 students were in the single- story building when the shooting 
began. Five died at the scene and two others expired at the hospital. In a jailhouse 
interview a few days later, Mr. Goh apologized for his killing rampage, which he said he 
did not remember. He is currently awaiting trial.97 
On Friday, December 14, 2012, Adam Lanza, 20, killed his mother at home and 
then proceeded to Sandy Hook Elementary School in his mother’s car with three of her 
firearms: A .223 caliber Bushmaster rifle and two hand guns. Upon arrival, he forcibly 
entered the school and opened fire killing 26 people including 20 students and six faculty 
members and injuring two others. Lanza killed himself prior to the arrival of police.98  
C. CONCLUSION AND DATA ANALYSIS OF MASS MURDERS IN 
EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS 
This compendium was developed through the examination of over 100 incidents 
of school shootings identified through Internet searches, media reports, official 
government reports and private compendiums.99 As a fairly representative sample of all 
mass murders that occurred in the United States between 1853 and 2012, it allows us to 
observe some commonalities.100   
School shootings are overwhelmingly perpetrated by males (98.9 percent). Just 
three of 26 incidents of extreme violence in schools were perpetrated by females and one 
of 18 (.05 percent) of mass murders were committed by a female perpetrator. These 
                                                 
97 “Oakland Shooting: One Goh ‘Deeply Sorry about Rampage,” The Telegraph, 12 April 2012. 
Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/9199033/Oakland-shooting-One-
Goh-deeply-sorry-about-rampage.html.   
98 James Barron, New York Times, “Nation Reels after Gunman Massacres 20 Children at School in 
Connecticut,” December 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/nyregion/shooting-reported-
atconnecticutelementary.school.html?gwh=68E20CE3653F19EBA592305F9D444DE8/. 
99 Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation. New York City Police 
Department (2010). 




results are consistent with other studies.101 The greatest number of victim fatalities 
occurred when the perpetrator(s) combined firearms and improvised explosive devices 
regardless of the devices’ effectiveness. Such instances account for 55 deaths, 
representing 37 percent of all mass murder deaths in educational environments. 
Perpetrators of school shootings armed themselves with multiple weapons in 30 percent 
(8 of 26) of the instances. Rifles alone were used for mass murders in the majority of the 
cases (58 percent) until 1989 (7 of 12 incidents) when semiautomatic pistols replaced 
rifles as the weapon of choice 15:1. A note about weapons:  reporting about weapons in 
school shooting attacks is often inaccurate and inconsistent.102  Media reports do not 
often include specific information about weapons and when they do the reports often 
confuse rifles and shotguns, semiautomatic weapons, “machine guns” and “assault 
weapons.”103   
The results of this analysis and a comparison with other studies reveal specific 
steps officials can under-take to prevent active shooter events from occurring in 
educational environments and potentially mitigate the devastating consequences and 
increase the survivability should an event unfold.104 Legislation, planning and 
preparation may have the biggest impact in reducing incidents of school violence and 
mitigating their effects, as discussed later in this paper.  
Although the sample size for mass murders in educational environments is 
limited, fully 50 percent of all incidents of extreme violence in the United States since 
1927 were committed by people 18 years old or younger and in all of these incidents (100 
percent) the perpetrator was armed with a gun. In 35 percent of these mass murders, the 
perpetrators were younger than 18 and also used a firearm.  
Many of these characteristics are highlighted on the case studies discussed below. 
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IV. DETAILED CASE STUDIES 
A. VIRGINIA TECH AND NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY 
Case studies offer valuable lessons and may perhaps illuminate ways to prevent 
attacks on college campuses. While there have been more than a dozen shootings on 
college campuses that resulted in mass casualties of three or more fatalities since 1990, 
the following case studies of the 2007 Virginia Tech college campus murders and the 
2008 Northern Illinois University mass murders represent of the most deadly and 
significant incidents of extreme violence in educational environments over the past five 
years. These cases were selected not only for their high death tolls but also for the fact 
that they had a considerable impact on university campuses across the country and 
underscore the meticulous planning and preparation undertaken by most perpetrators. 
These two incidents alone caused the violent death of 37 people on U.S. college 
campuses within 10 months.  
Located on a plateau between the Blue Ridge and Allegheny mountain ranges, 
Virginia Polytechnic and State University (Virginia Tech) is a public land grant 
university in Blacksburg, Virginia. Featuring undergraduate, graduate and terminal 
degrees in a wide range of academic fields and disciplines, Virginia Tech is well known 
for its engineering and sciences programs. The university has over 30,000 full time 
students, 7,000 employees and more than 1,000 visitors on campus every day. The 
campus includes 131 noncontiguous buildings spread over 2,600-acres. Virginia Tech has 
a full-time police department consisting of 53 sworn police officers and shares 
jurisdiction with the Blacksburg Police Department and Montgomery County Sheriff’s  
Office.105 The Virginia Tech Police Department enjoys an excellent relationship with the 
Virginia State Police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.106 
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On April 16, 2007, Seung Hui Cho was a disturbed and angry fourth year 
undergraduate student at Virginia Tech when he went into a murderous rampage, killing 
32 people on campus in a multiple location targeted attack.107  With a history of mental 
illness and despite federal law prohibiting it, Mr. Cho was able to purchase two 
semiautomatic firearms, as well as several extended magazines and hundreds of rounds of 
ammunition.  
Mr. Cho exhibited signs of mental illness since early childhood. Born with serious 
health problems in Seoul, South Korea, he and his family immigrated to the United States 
in 1992, when he was eight-years old. He was raised in Fairfax County, Virginia after the 
age of nine. Mr. Cho’s middle school and high schools provided services to address his 
mental health problems, and his parents participated by providing private psychiatric 
counseling services. In 1999, after the Columbine High School murders, his teachers in 
middle school observed homicidal and suicidal ideation in his writings and recommended 
counseling, which he received.108  
When Mr. Cho started at Westfield High School in the Fall Semester of 2000, he 
was placed in an Individual Educational Program due to emotional problems and social 
awkwardness and continued in therapy through his junior year. He received good grades 
in high school, kept his counseling appointments, exhibited no behavior problems and 
made no threats. 
Mr. Cho graduated from Westfield High School with honors in June 2003, and 
against the advice of his parents and counselors, decided to go to Virginia Tech. Parents 
and counselors thought the school was too large and were concerned that he would not 
receive the individual attention he needed. 
Mr. Cho’s history of mental illness at Virginia Tech did not emerge until his 
junior year, when serious problems begin to surface.109  Both his sister and his dormitory 
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suitemates noticed odd and disconcerting behavior. Mr. Cho’s sister noted that the 
frequency of his writing had changed, and he was withdrawn. His suitemates witnessed 
aggressive displays of behavior that included stabbing a carpet repeatedly with a knife 
during a party. His poetry professor, Nikki Giovanni, was concerned about violence in his 
writing and inappropriate classroom behavior. Professor Giovanni related her concerns in 
writing to the department chair, Lucinda Roy, who removed him from class, referred him 
to counseling services and tutored him individually with the assistance of another 
professor.        
Dr Roy encouraged Mr. Cho to attend counseling sessions and when he refused 
she notified Mary Ann Lewis, the Associate Dean of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences, 
as well as the Division of Student Affairs, the Cook Counseling Center, the Schiffert 
Health Center, the Virginia Tech Police Department, and the College of Liberal Arts and 
Human Sciences. Mr. Cho was discussed at the university’s Care Team Meeting that 
reviews student issues.110 
In November 2005, a female student at the university filed a formal complaint 
with the university police department about Mr. Cho’s annoying behavior. An officer 
from the Virginia Tech Police Department (VTPD) interviewed Mr. Cho and referred 
him to the Office of Judicial Affairs, the school’s disciplinary system. Following this 
interaction, Mr. Cho called the Cook Counseling Center and was triaged over the 
telephone.111  
As more people became aware of Mr. Cho’s interaction with police, more 
instances of odd and inappropriate behavior came to light. Over the next two weeks, his 
bizarre behavior continued. He missed a scheduled appointment at the Cook Counseling 
Center and once again police were alerted.  
On December 13, 2005, VTPD took Mr. Cho into custody, instructed him to have 
no further contact with a female student who complained of his behavior and took him 
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for mental health screening at the New River Valley Community Services Board. Mental 
health professionals there evaluated him as a threat to himself and others. A local 
magistrate issued a detaining order, and Mr. Cho was transported to the Carilion St. 
Albans Psychiatric Hospital for an overnight commitment and a mental health 
evaluation.112 
On December 14, 2005, Mr. Cho was evaluated by two mental health 
professionals at the hospital, an independent psychologist and a staff psychiatrist, both of 
whom determined that he was no longer a danger to himself or to others. At a 
commitment hearing, a special justice magistrate ruled in accordance with the mental 
health professionals, and following the psychiatrist’s recommendation, ordered him to 
receive outpatient counseling. Mr. Cho was again triaged by the Cook Counseling Center 
for the third time in 15 days.113 
No action was ever taken by the Cook Counseling Center, Division of Student 
Affairs, Schiffert Health Center, Virginia Tech Police Department, the College of Liberal 
Arts and Human Sciences, the Care Team, the special justice magistrate or Carilion St. 
Albans Psychiatric Hospital to follow up on Mr. Cho.114 
During the spring and fall semesters of 2006, several of Mr. Cho’s professors 
became aware of numerous instances of inappropriate and violent themes in his writing 
assignments, some remarkably similar to the events that eventually unfolded on April 16, 
2007. In September, Professor Lisa Norris, one of his professors, inquired of Mary Ann 
Lewis, the Associate Dean of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences about Mr. Cho, but Ms. 
Lewis found no record of mental health issues or police reports. She failed to remember 
the 2005 and 2006 instances in which she was notified115 Professor Norris encouraged 
Mr. Cho to go to counseling, but he declined.  
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During the spring 2006 semester, Mr. Cho purchased two semiautomatic pistols, a 
.22 caliber Walther P22 and a 9mm Glock Model 19. The store initiated the required 
background checks that should have barred the purchases but failed to discover his 
history of mental health problems. He also purchased six extended ammunition 
magazines and hundreds of rounds of ammunition. 
In March 2006, Mr. Cho practiced with his newly purchased firearms at a local 
pistol range and on April 14, 2007, an Asian male was observed chaining the doors shut 
at Norris Hall. It was later determined that Mr. Cho may have been practicing there as 
well.  
On April 16, 2007, Mr. Cho rose early and was seen by a suitemate on his 
computer. He left his dorm at approximately 5:30 a.m. and was seen outside and 
appeared to be awaiting access to West Ambler Johnson Hall at 6:45 am. Although his 
university mailbox was located in this dormitory, he did not have access privileges until 
7:30. After he gained access to the building, he eventually went to the fourth floor. At 
about 7:15 a.m., he encountered Emily Hilscher, a student and resident of the dorm who 
had just been   dropped off at the dorm by her boyfriend.116  Mr. Cho shot Hilscher in her 
room and then shot Ryan Christopher Clark, a resident assistant, who may have been 
alerted to Hilscher’s distress by loud noises emanating from her room, which was next to 
his own. Both students died of their wounds.117 
Mr. Cho then returned to his dorm to change out of his bloody clothes. 
The preceding events triggered a series of premature and flawed decisions by 
university officials that were based on assumptions, conjecture, insufficient evidence and 
inadequate facts. Residents of West Ambler Hall initially reported to police that a student 
had merely fallen out of bed, albeit a high bunk bed. This grossly inaccurate and 
inadequate description of the event did not convey the sense of urgency necessary to save 
lives and apprehend the perpetrator, which is critical in the initial minutes of a homicide 
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and no doubt delayed police response, as well as the deployment of advanced life-saving 
resources. Several minutes later, upon the arrival of police, they discovered that two 
people were actually shot and requested additional medical and police resources. A friend 
of Ms. Hilscher arrived at her room between 7:30 and 8:00 a.m. and told police that Ms. 
Hischer was frequently dropped off early Monday mornings by her boyfriend, who was a 
student at a nearby university. She also reported that Ms. Hischer’s boyfriend was an avid 
gun enthusiast. This information triggered a manhunt for Ms. Hilscher’s boyfriend as the 
likely killer, not as an important witness or even as a person of interest. This intellectual 
and investigative laziness resulted in not only the fact that the murder investigation was 
misdirected, but misinformation was being continually disseminated to the law 
enforcement community and the Virginia Tech Policy Group, a university decision-
making authority. Considerable resources were expended in the search for Ms. Hischer’s 
boyfriend, as well as the mobilization of tactical personnel for the execution of search 
warrants and his arrest.118 
At 9:00 a.m., Mr. Cho mailed a package from the Blacksburg Post Office whose 
contents were not be revealed for two days until it arrived at NBC News in New York. 
The package contained pictures of Mr. Cho holding weapons and a rambling—only 
sometimes intelligible—1,800-word manifesto and video clips expressing rage at his 
oppressors. Mr. Cho also mailed a letter to a Virginia Tech professor with whom he had 
previously argued.119 
Between 9:15 and 9:30 a.m., Ms. Hilscher’s boyfriend was taken into custody 
during a car stop off campus, and campus administration sent an email message to the 
university community advising them that there had been a shooting in a dormitory on 
campus. Around the same time, Mr. Cho was seen in the vicinity of Norris Hall, a 
multilevel classroom building on campus.  
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Once inside Norris Hall, Mr. Cho chained three out of four building access doors 
closed. The fourth could not be secured with a chain and was subsequently the door used 
by police to gain access to the building.   
At about 9:40 a.m., Mr. Cho began shooting in a classroom on the second floor of 
Norris Hall. For the next 11 minutes, Mr. Cho walked back and forth unimpeded from 
classroom to classroom, shooting faculty and students. The first police officers arrived at 
Norris Hall within three minutes of the initial 911 call but could not gain access to the 
building. They were seen running back and forth between doors. Attempts by police to 
shoot doors open failed, until finally they arrived at the one door not secured with a chain 
and shot out the ordinary locking mechanism, and thus gained access to the building. 
While still on the second floor of Norris Hall, Mr. Cho fatally shot himself in the head 
before police had an opportunity to engage him.  
By 9:51 a.m. Cho had killed 30 people in Norris Hall and wounded 17. He 
expended 174 rounds of ammunition. 
B. NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY 
On the western edge of the I-88 corridor, an hour’s drive west of Chicago, 
Northern Illinois University is located in Dekalb, Illinois. Dekalb is a small midwestern 
city well known as a manufacturing and agricultural community with a population of 
45,000 residents. For more than a century, Northern Illinois University has helped nurture 
and support the manufacturing community through research, education and outreach. 
Originally a teachers’ college, NIU today offers advanced degrees in business, law, 
engineering and education. The university has a diverse graduate and undergraduate 
population of 23,000 students and 4,500 faculty and staff personnel.120  The campus is in 
an urban environment and includes 756 acres and 64 buildings. The Northern Illinois 
University Department of Public Safety consists of approximately 50 sworn police 
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officers and is supplemented by the City of Dekalb Police Department, Dekalb County 
Sheriff’s Department and the Illinois State Police. 
On February 14, 2008, Steven Kazmierczak was a confused, anxious and 
depressed graduate student at the University of Illinois in Champlain when he entered 
Cole Hall, a lecture hall at Northern Illinois University, and opened fire on 120 students 
taking a geology class in Ocean Sciences, killing five and wounding 21. Mr. 
Kazmierczak was well known to the NIU community, having received his bachelor’s 
degree there, graduating Summa Cum Laude two years prior. His last shot was to kill 
himself. 
Mr. Kazmierczak had struggled with mental illness since childhood. Suspicious 
that he may have a learning disability or attention deficit disorder at an early age, teachers 
described him as having difficulty concentrating, behaviorally careless and impulsive.121    
With a disturbing history of inappropriate behavior from an early age, he was 
institutionalized at the age of 16 after a suicide attempt. Mental health professionals 
described him as anxious, depressed, obsessional, angry, paranoid, suicidal and 
schizophrenic.122   
Born in Elk Grove, Illinois in 1980, Mr. Kazmierczak was a chronic 
underachiever throughout his primary and secondary school years. Evidence suggests he 
was not only a bully, but he was often bullied by other students during his early school 
years. His later writings, teachers noted, contained themes of violence and inappropriate 
behavior. His family reported that their early request that he receive a mental health 
evaluation was denied.123  
Mr. Kazmierczak was a disruptive force within the family. Verbally abusive and 
physically threatening, he was a significant source of familial chaos and disorder. He 
experienced an intense rivalry and lifelong enmity with his sister, and the relationship 
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with his mother was described as “openly conflicted and confrontational.”124  His father 
was described as uninvolved in the affairs of the family, although present in the home.     
Mr. Kazmierczak had frequent contact with the police for minor violations but 
was never arrested. At the age of 13, he and a friend constructed a crude improvised 
explosive device out of household chemicals and detonated it on the front porch of a 
neighbor. The device caused no damage and no charges were filed. He and this same 
friend were taken into custody for trespassing on commercial property, but no charges 
were filed. Prodded by his father, he was a reluctant informant in a narcotics investigation 
for the Elk Grove Village Police Department, which resulted in the arrest of this same 
friend, who then threatened to kill him.125  
Mr. Kazmierczak had frequent mental health interventions, having exhibited 
continued behavioral problems throughout his childhood and adolescence.126 His 
condition noticeably worsened in 1997 when he was 16 years old. He experienced 
chronic anxiety and depression resulting in seven suicidal gestures within 14 months and 
nine suicidal gestures for which he was institutionalized before he turned 18.127   
After graduating from high school in June of 1998, his family had become so 
afraid of Mr. Kazmierczak’s abusive and unpredictable behavior that they refused to 
allow him in their home. While he was institutionalized for yet another suicide attempt, 
they had him placed in a voluntary residential treatment program. It was while there that 
he was diagnosed with Schizoid Personality Traits, Schizoaffective Disorder and 
Psychosocial Stressors.128 
While at the residential treatment program, despite being heavily medicated, Mr. 
Kazmierzcak was a chronic behavior problem and experienced auditory hallucination, 
paranoia, severe social impairments and obsessional rituals. He chronically abused 
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marijuana while in treatment and gained weight, at one point weighing more than 300 
pounds. He lived day-to-day, contemplating suicide.129  Mr. Kazmierzcak stopped taking 
his medication, continued to abuse marijuana and violated other “house” rules, but before 
he could be transferred to a secure mental health institution for being noncompliant, he 
left. 
Mr. Kazmierzcak held a variety of jobs for very short periods of time until 
behavioral issues arose, and he was asked to leave or was fired. One job he left 
voluntarily, stating it was physically too demanding for him. 
Three weeks after Mr. Kazmierczak turned 21 years old and nine days after the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11, he joined the United States Army on September 20. A few 
months after enlisting, it was discovered Mr. Kazmierczak had falsified his application 
and denied having an extensive mental health history. He was placed in an Army hospital 
for evaluation and subsequently released from his commitment. He was returned to his 
home of record on February 14, 2002, six years to the day before his deadly rampage. 
In August 2002, Mr. Kazmierczak enrolled as an undergraduate student at 
Northern Illinois University while working at a Marathon Gas Station. He lived in one of 
the residence halls and was considered strange and weird by fellow students. Soon he 
began to focus intently on his school work and became isolated from others. He was 
described as being “exceedingly conscientious and compulsive.”130   
Known as “Strange Steve” to his roommates, Mr. Kazmierczak studied the 
Virginia Tech and Columbine tragedies. When he was not studying, he was fond of 
watching violent, gruesome horror movies.131 He is said to have become interested in 
horror movies by watching them with his mother as a child. After the events of February  
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14, 2008, and Mr. Kazmierczak had killed himself, his school mates claimed he was 
fascinated by extreme violence and mass murderers, such as Adolf Hitler, Ted Bundy and 
Jeffrey Dahmer.132 
Mr. Kazmierczak learned to function exceedingly well at NIU.133  As a major in 
criminology, he studied prisons as a way of understanding America. He eventually 
became vice president of the American Correctional Association on campus and was 
mentored by a professor who studied rehabilitation in correctional settings. Mr. 
Kazmierczak tutored other students in statistics and did very well in his course work. 
While a student, Mr. Kazmierczak co-authored an article with two of his 
professors and a fellow student published in the Journal of Criminology and Public 
Policy entitled “Self Injury in Correctional Settings: “Pathology” of Prisons or 
Prisoners?” 
In May 2006, he graduated from NIU Summa Cum Laude with a 3.88 GPA and 
won the Dean’s Award for highest academic honors.134   
Mr. Kazmierczak’s mother died in September 2006 after a long battle with ALS. 
He had not been close to his mother for years, seemingly showed no emotion and told no 
one of her death.135  
In the fall semester of 2006, Mr. Kazmieczak started taking graduate-level 
courses in sociology at NIU but applied to graduate school at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign because NIU had reduced faculty and course offerings in 
criminology. He stopped going to classes at NIU and started getting interested in guns.136     
On February 17, 2007, Mr. Kazmierczak bought a .45 caliber, semiautomatic, 
Glock handgun and on March 23 and 26, he bought a shotgun and another handgun from 
                                                 
132 David Vann, “Portrait of the School Shooter as a Young Man,”  Esquire, 12 Feb 2009. Available: 
http://www.esquire.com/features/steven-kazmierczak-0808–4.  
133 Peters, “Report of February 14, 2008 Shootings,” 25.  
134 Vann, “Portrait of the School Shooter,” 2009.  





Moser Guns in Dekalb, Illinois.137  He started going to a pistol range to practice shooting 
instead of going to classes. He failed all of his courses that semester. 
On April 16, 2007, Seung Hui Cho killed 32 people on the campus of Virginia 
Tech. Mr. Kazmierczak was fascinated with Mr. Cho’s preparation and planning and 
compared it to the planning and preparation used to prepare for the shooting rampage and 
mass murder committed by Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris at Columbine High School in 
1999. He studied every detail: where and how Mr. Cho purchased his weapons, Mr. 
Cho’s mental health history, Mr. Cho’s photos, timing and planning. He discussed the 
fine points with friends and sent copies of Mr. Cho’s writings to his girlfriend.138 He 
subsequently wrote a paper “(No) Crazies with Guns”139 questioning the advisability of 
allowing people with a history of mental illness to purchase weapons.  
In June 2007, Mr. Kazmierczak moved to Champaign, Illinois with his then, 
former girlfriend. They shared an apartment together, and it appears they both became 
aware that he was unraveling. Mr. Kazmierczak had not seen a mental health counselor in 
five years. He was irritable, picked fights with his former girlfriend and was obsessive 
about hand washing, checking doors, locks and stoves. He became anxious, worried and 
paranoid.140  
On August 3, 2007, Mr. Kazmierczak made an appointment at the McKinley 
Health Center on the campus of the University of Illinois in Champaign. He told the 
counselor that he was concerned about confidentiality and failed to disclose his 
significant history of mental health illness. He told the counselor he was only interested 
in receiving medication. She made an appointment for him to see a psychiatrist three days 
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later.141  He left the clinic that day and bought a 9mm Sig Sauer semiautomatic hand gun 
from Tony’s Guns and Ammo in Champlain, Illinois.142 
The psychiatrist observed “elements of social anxiety and obsessive/compulsive 
disorder” and prescribed Prozac.143  A month later on September 4, 2007, he returned to 
see the psychiatrist, who noted that Mr. Kazmierczak was anxious, paranoid and worried. 
The doctor asked him if he were planning to kill himself or anyone else to which he 
responded he was not. The doctor increased the Prozac medication and added Xanax for 
anxiety.144  
The next week Mr. Kazmierczak started a new job as a corrections officer at the 
Rockville Correctional Facility. Although the record is deficient, it is not clear if the 
correctional facility at the time had policies in place requiring drug screening, a pre-
employment psychological screening or a criminal background check. It is very clear, 
however, that Mr. Kazmierczak was taking prescription medication, had an extensive 
psychological history with a period of court-ordered confinement and several “scrapes” 
with the law as a juvenile. These factors did not prevent his employment and did not 
prevent him from being trained with a Remington shotgun.  
After Mr. Kazmierczak quit his job as a corrections officer, the next few weeks 
were filled with bizarre behavior, even by Mr. Kazmierczak’s standards. He wrote a hate-
filled blog post directed at his friends and faculty members at Northern Illinois 
University, he stopped taking his prescription medication for anxiety, he sought sex from 
men and women on Craigslist and engaged in indiscriminate sex with multiple partners. 
He was considered by friends, as well as himself, to be out of control.145   He emailed 
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photos of himself dressed as the gruesome “Jigsaw” character in the “Saw” movie series 
to friends and two days later had the “Jigsaw” character tattooed on his forearm.146 
On December 27, 2007, he purchased a .380 caliber semiautomatic Hi Point pistol 
from Tony’s Gun and Ammo.147  Just before the New Year, Mr. Kazmierczak had begun 
to isolate himself from his friends and began preparations for his murderous rampage in 
February by purchasing weapons and ammunition and practicing his shooting skills with 
virtual weapons. On January 29, he called a Navy recruiter and said he would like to 
enlist. They discussed his previous discharge, and he was told he would have to pass a 
psychiatric exam.148 
On February 4, 2008, just ten days before the deadly attacks, he emailed a friend 
who asked about his plans for the weekend. Mr, Kazmierczak responded: ‘No I’m not 
busy. Just plotting world domination and all (sic)…”  He then asked his friend if he had 
heard about a recent mass murder referring to a man who killed five people execution-
style in a botched robbery attempt.149 Mr. Kazmierczak never disguised his fascination 
with extreme violence.  
On February 4, 2008, he bought holsters, ammunition, tactical magazine pouches 
and magazines for his Glocks, and he continued to order ammunition from various 
sources. On February 6, he bought a Remington shotgun and on February 9, 2008, a 9mm 
Glock 19 semiautomatic pistol from Tony’s Guns and Ammo in Champlain.150   
On February 10, 2008, Mr. Kazmierczak began final preparations. He left 
Champaign in the afternoon for the three-hour drive to Dekalb. He checked into a hotel 
and after a few minutes checked out again. He checked into another hotel, paid cash and 
began making telephone calls to family and friends. He talked to his father and godfather 
and made plans to meet the next weekend to play chess. He bought his former girlfriend 
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gifts including an iPhone, books, data cables, earrings and an engagement ring and called 
her to tell her he was sending her a package but not to open it until Valentine’s Day.  
He received a call from the Navy recruiter but said he was too busy to come into 
the office.151 
On February 13, he went to the post office to mail his former girlfriend the 
package as promised with the return address: a pseudonym Robert Paulson, the name of a 
character from the movie Fight Club who attained greatness after death. The return 
address on the package was his former dorm room.152  
Just after 3:00 in the afternoon on Valentine’s Day, February 14, 2008, Steven 
Kazmierczak entered Cole Hall through a rear stage door. He was interrupting the Ocean 
Sciences class just as the class was ending. He walked quickly to center-stage, paused 
briefly, raised and then fired the shotgun into a row of students. He fired three more times 
and then jumped down from the stage. He fired the shotgun two more times and then 
dropped it after reloading and drew a 9mm Glock. He walked calmly up one of the aisles 
as he repeatedly fired the 9mm. Forty-eight shots later, five students lay dead and 18 
were injured. He then jumped back up onto the stage and fired once more, killing himself.      
C. RECOMMENDATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM DETAILED CASE 
STUDIES 
It is sometimes easy after the fact to look at missed opportunities to prevent these 
attacks or to connect the dots afterwards and conclude that the events were predictable. 
For example, a university administrator at Virginia Tech had seen many similar cases and 
had several reports about Mr. Cho but never put the pieces together. Mr Cho’s college 
roommate dismissed obvious mental derangement as youthful awkwardness and 
immature indiscretion. This kind of thinking led to many inaccurate judgments in 
retrospect. 
                                                 
151 Vann, “Portrait of the School Shooter,” 2009. 
152 Vann, Also excerpt from Fight Club: “His Name is Robert Paulson” [video file]. Available: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GCi_PIz5ekU “In death, a member of project mayhem has a name, his 




Police response to these events failed dreadfully. Inadequate planning and 
insufficient preparation resulted in countless deaths. Failure to prepare students and 
faculty about how to react and respond to active shooters and facilitate police interdiction 
strategies were notably absent. It may be unfair to scrutinize this aspect of these two 
events too closely because police response is inadequate in 95 percent of all active 
shooter events nationwide.153      
The medical examiners’ response to identify victims was painstakingly slow for 
family members who were aware that it was likely their child or loved one was dead but 
did not have confirmation. Some waited three days after the Virginia Tech incident to 
receive official notification. Collaboration before such an event increases understanding 
among first-responders that can aid in identification and convey important information to 
those who need it.   
These brutal and sadistic acts of extreme violence on college campuses were 
perpetrated by adult men about to embark on new chapters in their lives. Cho would have 
graduated from Virginia Tech in a few weeks, and Kazmierzcak had recently graduated 
from Northern Illinois University and begun graduate school at the University of Illinois. 
Many had overlooked the obvious and long-term signs of suffering experienced by these 
young men. While much of their behavior foreshadowed the viciousness to come, family 
and friends felt powerless to intervene.  
While these men must be held ultimately responsible for their actions, others are 
responsible as well. A society that allows people with extensive histories of mental illness 
and institutional commitments the ability to purchase firearms is responsible, as are the 
state and federal legislators who propose unthinking legislation swayed by failed 
arguments from lobbying groups. Also responsible are gun dealers who failed to conduct 
the requisite background checks, as well as the government officials who failed to 
                                                 




diligently administer policies that would have ensured that people with histories of 
mental illness and institutional confinement do not to have access to firearms.154 
The analysis of the Virginia Tech and Northern Illinois University case studies 
has revealed that we can do a much better job of preparing for these acts of extreme 
violence on college campuses.  
FBI Director Robert S. Mueller said: “Our greatest weapon against terrorism is 
unity.”155 The nature and gravity of school shootings requires constant attention to detail 
to insure that police are responsive to the needs of the communities they serve. 
Effectively engaging the whole of government for information and action is essential to 
successful law enforcement and community resiliency. This can be achieved by 
establishing School Assessment Teams (SAT) composed of police (commanders, 
supervisors, SRO and ESU personnel), educators (teachers, administrators and clerical 
personnel) and mental health professionals (social workers, psychologists, psychiatrists 
and counselors) as well as students, facility managers and staff. The evidence suggests a 
comprehensive policy of prevention, protection, response and resiliency are not only 
effective in preventing attacks and protecting educational environments, but also in 
saving lives and fostering a caring, nurturing and healing community environment after a 
devastating school assault. 
As different as the foregoing incidents of extreme violence in educational 
environments appear, they each share four unique characteristics. All of the perpetrators 
in each of the scenarios experienced an intense reaction to a perceived grievance, all had 
previously expressed their grievance to others, including authorities, they were all 
knowledgeable about the weapons they used—indicating advanced training— and they 
each had assistance from someone else, albeit sometimes an unknowing co-conspirator. 
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In the next chapter, we review how international school shootings related to 












V. INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL SHOOTINGS RELATED 
TO TERRORISM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
International school shooting incidents related to terrorism offer important lessons 
for U.S. policy-makers. As we saw in the previous chapter, lessons learned from previous 
attacks are instrumental when planning and preparing for active shooter events on college 
campuses. Terrorism cases in Israel and Russia demonstrate that response preparedness is 
essential to save lives, and it may prevent further pain and suffering of American school 
children.  
While many school shooters in the United States have expressed radical and 
sometimes even hateful political views, only three occasions rise to the level of terrorist 
attacks against schools experienced elsewhere in the world. The 1927 Bath School 
Massacre (38 dead), the 2007 Virginia Tech Murders (32 dead) and the December 14, 
2012, Sandy Hook Elementary School Shootings (26 dead) are examples of incidents of 
horrific violence in this country that are comparable to the terrorist-led violence found 
elsewhere in the world.156   
Responding to terrorist events in educational environments requires highly skilled 
and motivated individuals. In the United States, it is not feasible to train military 
personnel to respond to every school shooting. Local police must be trained to collaborate 
with the community, interdict, respond, evaluate, adapt and end such an attack. Such 
planning prepares educational environments for the physical and psychological impacts 
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of such events, encourages resiliency and aids first responders in understanding the skills 
and equipment that may be required for such outlier events. 
By preparing for a terrorist attack, other school attacks will likely be more easily 
prevented, confronted and terminated. Terrorists use time to gain tactical advantage, 
therefore, quick and effective law enforcement response is essential. Training of 
educators and students is vital as well. 
Lessons from the following international incidents are poignant to inform, prevent 
and respond to extreme violence in educational environments. The perpetrators in the 
following international case studies, representing well-planned, targeted school attacks, 
terrorized communities with advanced training and well-executed, military-like precision. 
Much like the Virginia Tech and NIU murders that had widespread impacts on college 
campuses across the country, these incidents demonstrate the importance of whole-of-
government preparation and response. They also demonstrate the devastating 
effectiveness of multiple targeted attack locations and the confusion they inspire among 
first responders.  
B. ISRAEL 
On May 15, 1974, three members of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (DFLP), a Palestinian terrorist group from Lebanon, armed with automatic 
weapons and hand grenades entered Israel through the Moshav Zar’it in Upper Galilee 
and embarked on a two-day reign of terror. Upon entering Israel, in an unsuccessful 
attempt to hijack a vehicle, they killed two Christian Arab Israeli female passengers. The 
driver escaped in the vehicle. Later, going door-to-door at 3 o’clock in the morning, the 
terrorists killed three members of a family, including a pregnant woman and a 4-year-old 
boy. They also shot a 5-year-old girl. The terrorists then went to the Netiv Meir 
elementary school in Ma’alot, Israel where they took 105 children and 10 adults hostage. 
They demanded the release of 23 Palestinian terrorists held in Israeli custody. In the 




Defense Forces’ Golani Brigade, stormed the school. The terrorists immediately began 
executing the hostages, killing 25 people, including 22 children and injuring 68 others.  
In response to this incident, the Israeli Defense Force bombed buildings and 
training bases of the DFLP and PLFP, killing 27 and injuring 138.157     
A subsequent official review of the Ma’alot incident, the Horav Commission, 
resulted in a recommendation that called for the establishment of a distinctive police 
antiterrorist response unit specializing in hostage and rescue operations.158   
The Sayeret Matkal, as part of the IDF, is a conscripted service. Most of the 
soldiers serve three and a half years and then are released from service.159  They received 
little counterterrorism training. The Horav Commission, recognizing the extremely high 
level of expertise necessary for hostage rescue missions, recommended these situations 
be handled by the police, who spend considerably more time in service (the average 
minimum is 10 years) and can be trained to the necessary expert level. These 
recommendations eventually led to the development of the elite Yaman unit. 
Yaman (special operations) police officers are typically military veterans who 
receive 12 months of basic training upon entering the police service. They receive 
specialized firearms training and counterterrorism training, which includes familiarity 
with structure and vehicle take over, dynamic entry, use of explosives, repelling, 
negotiation and dog handling.160  Yaman’s emphasis on speed, silence and skill are 
critical counterterrorism techniques for an effective response to terrorist hostage-taking 
situations in educational environments.161 
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Multiple assault locations are not a recent phenomenon, as some believed after the 
2008 Mumbai incident, but rather were seen in the 1927 Bath School House Massacre, 
1974 Ma’alot Massacre and 2007 Virginia Tech murders.162  
Thirty four years after the first school shooting in Israel, a Palestinian terrorist 
struck again, this time with different tactics.  
On March 6, 2008, Alaa Abu Dhein, 26, a devote Muslim and resident of 
Jerusalem, entered the prestigious Jewish seminary, Mercaz HaRav Yeshiva in Jerusalem 
and opened fire with a Soviet-made assault weapon while students prayed. Armed with 
over 500 rounds of ammunition in extended magazines, he shot 19 students, killing eight. 
It was the deadliest attack on an Israeli school in 34 years. Witnesses said the killing 
rampage went on for 20 minutes before the gunman was killed by a former student and 
member of the Israeli Defense Force who lived nearby.  
Similar to the Columbine school massacre in the U.S. in 1999, the first police 
unit, which arrived within four minutes of the first report of the shooting, and two police 
detectives who arrived within nine minutes did not enter the Yeshiva, and instead awaited 
specially trained officers. Although Abu Dhein left no statement describing his motive, 
speculation exists that the massacre came in response to violence in Gaza. Hamas praised 
the attack but denied responsibility.163164 The official Israeli government response to this 
school shooting was somewhat muted, angering many Israelis: Ehud Olmert, Israel’s 
Prime Minister called the attack “horrible” and the Knesset speaker called for demolition 
of the terrorist family’s home. Yuli Tamir, Israel’s Education Minister, was forced to 
leave a condolence visit at the yeshiva two days after the attack when she was verbally 
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attacked by youths outside the school for what was seen as the government’s inadequate 
response.165  Mr. Olmert was told he was not welcome at the school.   
Israel is a notable case study that demonstrates that certainty, severity and celerity 
can deter school terrorist attacks. In 1970, a PFLP terrorist attack on a school bus in 
Avivam resulted in a swift and severe response by Israel, culminating in the bombing and 
then patrolling of southern Lebanon.166  When Palestinian terrorists attacked a school 
four years later, the response was not only swift and severe, it had enduring 
consequences. The Horav Commission inspired long-term change in terms of policy and 
tactics and sent a clear message of certainty and celerity that school terrorist attacks 
would be punished. There was not another school terrorist attack in Israel for 34 years, 
suggesting that the implemented changes were effective.  
In 2002, Palestinian terrorists again attacked a school when a bomb in a cell 
phone detonated at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, killing nine students. Again, the 
response was swift, severe and certain. Israeli authorities rounded up more than a dozen 
Hamas terrorists in response to this attack.167  This incident took place only six years 
before another school attack (Mercaz HaRav) in Israel, resulting in the deaths of eight 
people. Given the dissimilarities with the Mercaz HaRav terrorist attack and the others, a 
lone gunman versus a group of terrorists, it is difficult to make comparisons or draw 
specific conclusions. But it will be interesting to determine if the public’s perception that 
the official government response was inadequate was viewed similarly by terrorists. The 
question: was the response sufficient to deter future attacks and terrorist activity in 
schools in Israel?  
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On September 1, 2004, heavily armed insurgents seized Middle School Number 
One in Beslan, North Ossetia, in a disputed area of southern Russia, not far from 
Chechnya. It was the first day of school; so many parents had taken their children to 
school for opening day ceremonies.168  At about 8:45 a.m., approximately three dozen 
terrorists arrived at the school in multiple vehicles armed with automatic weapons, 
grenades, sniper rifles, night vision equipment, gas masks, improvised explosive devices 
and silencers.169 When the armed terrorists entered the school, they immediately began 
shooting. In less than 20 minutes, they seized more than 1,000 hostages, including 
children, teachers, parents and grandparents. They forced the hostages into the gym and a 
small adjacent courtyard. Many of the intended hostages were able to escape and some 
who were trapped inside the cavernous building were able to hide. A school security 
guard and an off-duty police officer immediately engaged the terrorists and exchanged 
gunfire but were quickly killed. They were, however, able to kill one terrorist.170  Twelve 
people died in the initial attack.171  By 9:05 a.m. 1,181 hostages, mostly children, were 
seized.  
The group’s leader, known as “Khuchbarov,” established control of the school 
and is said to have killed fellow terrorists who balked at his orders.172  Although many of 
the details of the siege are still in dispute, Chechen insurgent leader Shamil Basayev, who 
was not at the school, claimed responsibility for the attack, saying a unit from the terrorist 
group Salakin Riadus Shakhidi (Chechen Martyrs) was responsible for carrying out his 
orders. The terrorists were made up of mostly Chechen and Inguish men and women and 
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some who were Arab. The Chechen and Ingush guarded the hostages and the interior 
perimeter, while the Arabs—due to language difficulties—were assigned to the outer 
perimeter and building entrances. 
Once inside the school, the terrorists cut off all outside communication by taking 
the hostages’ cell phones. They quickly deployed explosives throughout the school, 
connecting them to pressure release (“dead man switch”) detonation devices. Three 
explosive devices were strung menacingly over the hostages’ heads across the gym and 
connected to the basketball hoop backboards.173 The main entrances to the school and 
gym were booby-trapped with improvised explosive devices. 
On the morning of the first day, 16 men and older boys were segregated in an 
adjacent room to the gym and executed. Over the course of the siege, at least 21 men and 
boys were killed in this manner. 
The terrorists told the hostages “We came here to die with you.”174 The terrorists 
were accused of bizarre and brutal acts of torture and rape.175  Russian authorities insist 
the terrorists never made any formal demands.176  The hostage takers also declared a 
“hunger strike” and insisted their hostages participate. Children became sick, faint and 
hysterical when they were denied food and water for more than two days.  
Local police, Soldiers, Special Forces operators and local armed citizens and 
militia members surrounded the school, creating a “nervous standoff” that continued for 
three days.177  Some of the militia members outside were armed with Rocket Propelled 
Grenades (RPG) and machine guns.  
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The leader of South Ossetia, a disputed region of Georgia, desirous of rejoining 
Russia and willing to do anything to help his neighbors to the north, sent battle hardened 
troops, weary from fighting the Georgians, to establish control.178   
The local Beslan police, supplemented by the Vladikavkaz police, a neighboring 
police department, attempted to establish control and secure the perimeter around the 
school but were outgunned and outnumbered by local militia men, who would not 
move.179 
Government troops began to arrive and despite President Putin’s pledge not to 
storm the school, Russia’s elite Alpha and Vympel, Counter Terrorism and Special 
Forces units, began to arrive and assemble at the Beslan Culture Center, which was being 
used as the command post, 200 meters from the school.   
A few hours into the siege, the terrorists delivered a video tape of the conditions 
inside the school to the officials outside.180  Government officials said the tape was 
blank, but a video tape of the terrorists and hostages inside the school made it onto 
television worldwide. When a communications link was established, hostage negotiators 
were baffled by the terrorist’s refusal to make demands.  
President Putin, who had returned from vacation on the Black Sea in Sochi, 
Russia 550 km away from Beslan had tried to establish that he was in command of the 
situation but refused to compromise his own policy against negotiating with terrorists.181  
Putin dispatched the Interior Minister and FSB director to the scene, although no one 
recalls seeing either one. The president of North Ossetia, Aleksandr Dzasokhov also 
claimed that he was in command of the situation.182 
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Throughout the crisis, the greatest single obstacle to the tactical deployment of the 
Alpha and Vympel teams were the huge crowds of onlookers outside the school, many of 
whom were armed and many of them who were drunk.183  The crowds provoked the 
terrorists at every opportunity. Some even fired shots at the school, which contained their 
loved ones and scores of children. Fights broke out among the onlookers and a raucous, 
alcohol-fueled atmosphere pervaded the assembly.184 
The terrorists continued to fortify the school and establish positions throughout 
the day. As night fell, hostages were ordered by the terrorists to throw the dead bodies out 
of the windows. 
The next day the Alpha and Vympel teams trained for their counter assault. 
Negotiations were sporadic:  some hostages were unexpectedly released while others 
continued to be executed. 
The crowds around the school prevented a surprise attack by the elite troops due 
to their enthusiastic cheers. The third day began with the terrorists firing shots out of the 
school’s windows at the police officers, soldiers and civilian onlookers who were 
assembled outside, some of whom were shot.185  Bystanders refused to move away. 
The terrorists agreed to allow officials to remove the dead and decomposing 
corpses thrown out of the windows over the course of the three-day siege. As the officials 
entered the courtyard, and the terrorists continued to retrieve the dead from inside the 
school and throw the bodies out of the windows, a huge blast erupted from inside the 
school. Both sides, believing they were duped by the agreement to remove the corpses, 
panicked, as did the hostages who started jumping out of the windows. What later turned 
out to be an accidental detonation of two terrorist bombs resulted in a full activation of 
the terrorists’ counter assault plans. The Russian troops outside opened fire, Alpha 
snipers began to take out any terrorist seen through a window, and armed civilians and 
                                                 
183 Giduck, Terror at Beslan, 125. 
184 Ibid., 131. 




militia men opened fire as Alpha and Vympel assault teams vainly attempted to assemble 
and then enter the school. Many of the members of the Alpha and Vympel Teams were 
killed when they were shot in the back by bystanders as they entered the kill zone. Those 
that were able to enter the school were forced to fight every step of the way against a 
heavily armed, fortressed and “medicated” enemy.186  Fighting was close combat, no 
more than 4 to 5 feet away and hand to hand at many points.187  Some of the terrorists 
were able to escape to nearby houses where military troops tracked and killed them. 
Other terrorists continued to flee throughout Beslan. Fighting continued for hours as 
firemen battled fires while being shot at in hostile combat environments. 
The last terrorist died at 11:20 p.m., 12 hours after the fighting began. Three 
hundred and thirty civilians were killed including 172 children. Eleven soldiers from 
Alpha and Vympel were also killed. Thirty-one of approximately 49 terrorists were killed 
and only 17 of those were ever identified.188  The school’s inferno rendered certainty and 
closer examination impossible.189     
Many strategic errors occurred during the Beslan siege and each had cascading 
tactical consequences. Faulty intelligence, a dismissive, “it won’t happen here” mentality 
and an over reliance on cultural mores prevented more diligent planning before the first 
day of school.190   
The Russian government had been monitoring the Islamist militant separatist 
movement in Chechnya for many years, particularly since the 2002 Nord-Ost Moscow 
theater hostage crisis that killed 129 hostages and 39 attackers. The theater crisis, also 
occurring during President Putin’s regime, was a very similar attack by 30 to 50 rebels 
that lasted for two and half days. The Russian government ended that siege on the third 
day, equally un-artfully, by pumping an unknown noxious gas into the theater’s 
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ventilation system just before commencing their assault. Many of the deaths were related 
to the noxious fumes, as well as gunfire.  
Inadequate leadership at the national and local level resulted in deficient direction, 
inferior tactics, and failure to establish control. No one knew who was in charge. The 
Russian President (Putin) claimed to be in charge, although, so did the president of North 
Ossetia, (Aleksandr Dzasokhov). Putin claimed to have sent two representatives, but no 
one recalls seeing them at the scene or the command center. Local leaders were unable to 
gain control of the spectators, much less the crisis situation. Even military leaders were 
impotent in exercising control of the scene.   
The best trained operators cannot operate to their potential in uncontrolled 
environments. The failure of civil authorities to establish and maintain control of the 
inner and outer perimeters of the Beslan School siege was a major setback and ultimately 
led to the loss of dozens, if not scores of innocent lives. Alpha and Vympel Teams are 
among the best trained special operators in the world. They enjoy a world renowned 
reputation for their extraordinary skill, courage and precision, accomplished through a 
ceaseless routine of training, preparation and planning. Had they been able to execute 
within hours rather than days of the initial siege, it is likely that they would have saved 
countless lives.  
The lawlessness of the on-lookers resulted in many deaths. Armed and drunken 
militia members contributed immeasurably to the terrorists’ objectives. Their refusal to 
move out of harm’s way and to disarm themselves was bad enough, but they also shot at 
the school building housing children and loved ones, alerting the rebels to counter 
assaults, and ultimately and senselessly killed Alpha and Vympel rescuers.  
D. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
SCHOOL SHOOTINGS AS TERRORIST EVENTS 
Responding to international terrorist events in educational environments requires 
highly skilled and motivated individuals. Lessons learned from international school 




respond to politically motivated terrorist attacks. Planners must conduct realistic security 
assessments necessary to determine the schools vulnerability, identify multiple 
evacuation routes, designate hiding places that offer both cover and concealment, engage 
whole of community concepts that include faculty, staff including porters and custodians, 
and students. School administrators and police officials should jointly consider 
credentialed based access control policies and devices, closed circuit television to ensure 
the video feeds are available to first responders and a communications infrastructure to 
allow real time messaging. Training school officials in response options as outlined by 
the Department of Homeland Security when an active shooter is in the vicinity of a 
school is paramount. Life saving alternatives such as Run, Hide and Fight, or Evacuate, 
Hide and Take Action are excellent protocols to train and implement when an active 
shooter situation arrives. Training several key members of the schools administration and 






















VI. A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH TO FIREARM LAWS AND 
THE REDUCTION OF EXTREME VIOLENCE 
A. FIREARMS LAWS AND THE PREVENTION OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE:  
A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH 
Ready access to powerful firearms played a key role in amplifying the death and 
destruction detailed in the previous case studies. Regulation of firearms is controversial 
in the United States. However, a public health approach to school violence prevention 
strategies to reduce firearm-related injury and death represents a potentially effective 
starting point. Such an approach involves both behavior-oriented and product-oriented 
methods.191   
The Center for Disease Control (CDC) reports that the source of guns used in 
school-related violent death is most frequently obtained from the perpetrator’s home 
(37.5 percent), or the home of a family member or friend (23 percent), suggesting that 
behavior-oriented approaches to prevent firearm-related homicides and suicides, such as 
gun control and gun safety training techniques, may be effective in preventing school 
violence. Behavior-oriented approaches have rarely been empirically tested, but these 
techniques include firearms safety training, pediatric counseling, firearms avoidance 
training, and legislative restrictions on children’s access to firearms. Another behavior-
oriented approach, suggested by the CDC to reduce school-related gun violence, is the 
secure storage of firearms.  
Product-oriented approaches, such as changing the design of firearms to make 
their use by unauthorized persons more difficult if stolen or obtained illegally, are also 
suggested. Safety features, such as trigger locks, grip safety devices, loaded chamber 
indicators and magazine disconnect devices are designed to reduce unintentional firearm 
discharges. Emerging biometric technologies are designed to prevent unauthorized  
 
 
                                                 




persons from firing or discharging a firearm. CDC finds similarities between firearm 
design changes and the beneficial effects of child poisoning prevention devices and motor 
vehicle safety programs.192 
Based on the successful efforts to reduce motor vehicle-related deaths, the CDC 
recommends a multifaceted approach to reduce firearms-related deaths and injuries. 
Education about the risks and benefits of gun ownership and possession of firearms, 
mandatory safe use strategies and safe gun storage are among CDC’s top 
recommendations.193  The CDC also suggests that legislative efforts to restrict access to 
firearms by children and regulate the safe storage, training, transport and use of firearms 
are important as well. The CDC reports a disproportionate impact of homicides with 
firearms on black people compared to white people. The age-adjusted death rate for 
firearms for black males (66.4 per 100,000) is three times higher than for white males 
(20.7 per 100,000).194 
B. THE EFFECTS OF MASS SHOOTINGS 
At this writing, it is impossible to determine if the recent shooting murders of 26 
people, mostly elementary age school children, in Newtown, Connecticut on December 
14, 2012 will have any lasting impact on increasing public pressure on policy-makers to 
adopt long-term policy changes. The effects of mass shootings on efforts to pass effective 
gun laws have been negligible in recent years. After a recent performance venue shooting 
in Aurora, Colorado, in which 70 people were shot, 58 of whom were wounded and 12 
who died, the public outcry was especially muted. Media reports indicate the alleged 
shooter, James E. Holmes, bought an AR-15 assault rifle, 2 semiautomatic .40 caliber 
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handguns, a shotgun, large-capacity ammunition magazines and 6,000 rounds of 
ammunition. The assault weapon was banned by federal legislation up until 2004 when 
the legislation expired and the ammunition was purchased virtually anonymously on line.  
The Aurora shooting occurred on July 20, 2012, in the midst of a U.S. Presidential 
campaign. Both major political party candidates expressed sadness about the deadly 
rampage, but neither expressed any interest in reviewing, evaluating or changing gun 
laws. Both major party candidates, President Barrack Obama and former Massachusetts’s 
Governor W. Mitt Romney supported assault weapon bans in the past.195   
Firearm-related deaths are positively correlated with the rate at which high school 
students carry weapons on school property.196  Daniel W. Webster, codirector of the 
Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research, found in a study published in 2009 
that comprehensive regulation, oversight of gun dealers and state regulation of private 
sales of handguns were each associated with lower rates of diversion of firearms to 
criminals.197  The availability of guns is an important factor in school shootings and gun 
control clearly keeps guns away from children.  
A few days after the deadly shooting in Aurora, in an editorial published on July 
25, 2012 in the New York Times, Nicholas Kristof, an editorial columnist, wrote about the 
dearth of gun legislation and suggested a tactic to reduce gun violence consistent with the 
CDC’s efforts to reduce motor vehicle fatalities.198  Mr. Kristof wrote that in our highly 
regulated society of fire codes, emergency exits, auditorium occupancy limits, movie 
rating systems, and wheel chair accessibility provisions, we are protected against most 
potential catastrophes except firearms and high-capacity ammunition magazines. He 
cleverly noted that we protect children from violence in movies but not in theaters and 
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argued that if traditional efforts at gun safety are not politically feasible we should pursue 
a public health effort to mitigate their harm. Mr. Kristof cites auto safety as one of the 
great successes of public health. Since many car accidents involve speeding and 
intoxication, offenders are prosecuted, but society also requires seat belts, air bags, 
graduated driver’s licenses for inexperienced drivers and better traffic engineering 
techniques for roads and intersections. These efforts have resulted in record low traffic 
fatality rates according to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.199 Mr. 
Kristof writes that the NRA will resist sensible gun legislation to protect the public 
health, but he also believes NRA members are much more reasonable than their 
organization’s leadership. He suggested background checks for all gun transfers, not just 
gun purchases, letters of recommendation for all potential gun owners, and restrictions on 
high-capacity gun magazines, among other initiatives. This writer would additionally 
recommend mandatory semi-annual firearms safety training similar to the requirements 
for police officers and other public safety officials who regularly carry firearms.  
C. INJURY PREVENTION RESEARCH 
David Hemenway, Professor of Health Policy at the Harvard School of Public 
Health and Director of Harvard’s Injury Control Research Center and Youth Violence 
Prevention Center, has pointed out the advantages of treating gun violence as a consumer 
product safety issue and public health problem. Guns are used to kill almost 80 people 
per day and wound almost 300 more people every day. Mr. Hemenway argues that if any 
other consumer product had a similar disastrous effect, the public response would be 
outrage. Yet, when it comes to guns, it is accepted as a natural consequence of American 
culture.200  In his book “Private Guns, Public Health,” Mr. Hemenway demonstrates how 
a public health approach that emphasizes prevention over punishment is effective in 
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reducing gun violence, just as a similar paradigm was used to successfully reduce 
incidents of infectious disease, car accidents and use of tobacco products.201 
Since antiquity, human injuries and accidents were regarded as unavoidable. With 
the advent of the modern age, environmental risk factors have become more apparent. In 
the 1960s and 70s, federal regulations improved traffic safety, consumer product safety, 
occupational safety and environmental protection.  
William Haddon Jr., MD, a public health physician and the first director of the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, who is considered the founder of 
modern injury prevention research, urged public health professionals to focus on 
changing the product rather than attempting to change human behavior.  
Dr. Haddon developed the “Haddon Matrix” to help researchers and policy 
makers determine how best to prevent injury. The “Haddon Matrix” is composed of three 
sequential (temporal) phases to study injury:  The Pre-Injury Phase, The Injury Phase, 
when energy is transferred to an individual, exceeding the body’s tolerance to absorb it, 
and The Post-Injury Phase, when the body attempts to restore homeostasis and repair the 
damage. These phases are then combined with traditional public health risk factors (host, 
agent, physical and social environments) to illustrate possible interventions to reduce the 
incidence of injuries.    
The Haddon Matrix has been used successfully for many environmental and 
social justice issues. Automobile safety faced vehement opposition from vehicle 
manufacturers, similar to the opposition from the gun manufacturers’ lobby today. It was 
through the collective resolve of the American Medical Association and American 
College of Surgeons, as well as through the scientific research published in the Journal of 
the American Medical Association, that the National Highway Safety Administration was 
created. The CDC calls the improvements in motor vehicle safety a “twentieth century 
public health achievement.”202  
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When applied to preventing firearm injuries, the Haddon Matrix presents 10 
injury control strategies. The Pre-Injury prevention phase presents opportunities to:  (a) 
Prevent the initial creation of the hazard by prohibiting gun purchases by dangerous and 
potentially dangerous people (convicted violent felons and the mentally ill), requiring 
background checks before gun purchases, and prohibiting the manufacture of certain 
types of dangerous firearms (manufacturing standards). (b) Reduce the amount of hazard 
through the production of less lethal weapons for self-protection and prohibiting the 
manufacture of dangerous ammunition and extended magazines. (c) Prevent the release 
of hazards that already exist by requiring safes, lock boxes and trigger locks, as well as 
child-proof firearms, smart guns and magazine safeties, banning firearms from locations 
that serve alcohol, and incarcerating violent firearm offenders.  
The Injury Phase presents opportunities to: (a) Improve secondary prevention 
components, through modification of the rate or spatial distribution of the hazard by 
requiring gun registration; (b) improve gun tracing and gun identification; separate the 
hazard in time and/or place from the person to be protected by requiring waiting periods 
to prevent impulsive violent actions; (c) install weapons detectors at performance venues, 
schools, stadiums and other areas where large groups of potential victims gather; (d) 
arrest chronic gun violators, batterers and other violent persons and remove their 
firearms; (e) impose a barrier between the hazard and the person to be protected by 
providing bullet resistant vests; offer bullet resistant barriers for high-risk individuals, 
such as the Pope and other officials; store clerks and taxi drivers; (f) modify surfaces to 
reduce injuries by redesigning bullets to reduce injury severity; (g) redesign firearms to 
reduce the rate of fire, and muzzle velocity; strengthen the resistance of people who may 
be injured by providing training, treatment and counseling to people with repeated 
victimizations; (i) train people in nonlethal and less-than-lethal self defense; and (h) 
promote self defense and personal security.203 
The Post-Injury Phase includes tertiary components to rapidly detect and limit 
damage, improve emergency medical and law enforcement response, provide rapid 
                                                 




air/ground transport for victims, improve emergency room triage and expedite 
appropriate medical treatment, assure prompt incarceration of firearm offenders and 
initiate long-term reparative actions such as improve rehabilitation, improve counseling 
for victims of gun violence, assure accessibility of workplace and other areas to those 
disabled by firearms.  
D. PUBLIC AND OFFICIAL REACTIONS 
The Reverend Jesse Jackson called the attack in Aurora, Colorado “not just an 
incident but part of a pattern…” and views it “…as the rise of domestic terrorism.”204    
Jackson, who witnessed the assassination of the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., on 
April 4, 1968, continued “I am convinced this kind of access to weapons emboldens 
international terrorists.”205  
After the Virginia Tech shooting on April 16, 2007, in which 32 people were 
killed and 23 wounded by a previously diagnosed mentally ill individual, Congress 
enacted legislation that requires states to share the names of mentally ill people with the 
National Instant Background Check System (NICS) for buying guns. This law was 
created to prevent mentally ill people with a mental health record in their own state from 
crossing state lines to purchase firearms (state’s already share criminal background 
information). The deadline for complying with the law was January, 2011, though gun-
control advocacy groups estimate more than a million files are missing nationwide, as 
discussed below.206     
After six people were murdered and 13 others wounded, including Rep. Gabrielle 
Giffords, in Tucson, Arizona in November 2010, President Barack Obama made an 
appeal to the American people to reform gun laws. Mr. Obama suggested enforcing the 
current legislation, particularly states’ compliance with legislation to populate NICS. He 
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also suggested making the system more accurate, comprehensive and consistent.207  The 
Justice Department then set up a series of meetings with gun rights activists and gun 
control advocates to put aside “stale policy debates” and enter “a new discussion.” The 
NRA declined to meet with the president.208  This was viewed by many as a sign of 
disrespect for a president who had expanded gun rights. It also might be viewed as a 
statement of disdain for the well-being and safety of the American public.209 
E. CURRENT DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES OBFUSCATE THE 
FACTS 
In the United States there are many challenges to evaluating the effectiveness of 
firearms laws on reducing violence. Information about firearms is collected to regulate 
firearms transactions from federally registered firearm dealers, not to track firearms or 
their use, and this information is limited to protect the privacy of firearm owners.210  
Additionally, some of the data sources for violent outcomes that are most readily 
available and widely used for research are of questionable value because of substantial 
underreporting.211 
There are some emerging opportunities to determine whether existing gun laws 
are an effective means of reducing violence, however. The FBI’s National Incident Based 
Reporting System and the CDC National Violent Death Reporting System will link 
multiple data sources on violent deaths to provide comprehensive information databases 
linking death certificates.212  Currently data is limited to only a few states. Keeping guns 
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out of the hands of the mentally ill is just one component of reducing school violence. 
The other is providing mental health treatment to those who need it.   
F. THE SECOND AMENDMENT  
Recommending reasonable federal firearm policies in America requires an 
understanding of the context and history in which such policy has been set. Any 
discussion of this topic must logically begin with the United States Constitution.  
Discussions about gun policy often include conversations about the rights granted 
by the Second Amendment. The Second Amendment was adopted to protect the right of 
the people in each of the states to maintain a well-regulated militia.213   It reads:  “A well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”  Special interest and gun advocacy groups 
often omit the first thirteen words, and many Americans believe that the Second 
Amendment provides for the right of private gun ownership. The historical record, 
however, was clear until recently. In a recent ruling by the United States Supreme Court 
in 2008 in the case, Washington, D.C., et al. vs. Heller, the court held that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess a firearm unconnected to military 
service. This case also attached a right of self defense within the home. Neither of these 
assertions is supported by the historical record, however, as is discussed below. 
In Heller, the Supreme Court did clarify, however, that the right to bear arms is 
not absolute. The court ruled that states could set restrictions and put regulations in place. 
Heller is likely to be reversed because it is not based on historical or legal precedent.214  
The Second Amendment focuses on state militias. Due to the distrust of a centralized 
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government, members of the Continental Congress, who adopted the Articles of 
Confederation in 1777, specified that every state “shall always keep up a well regulated 
and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accrued.”  It did not include any provision 
for the individual right to bear arms.215    
When the U.S. Constitution was adopted in 1776, each state had its own militia 
composed of ordinary citizens serving part time. The purpose of the militia was to secure 
the state from internal and external threats, such as riots and invasions.  
Many Americans claim the Second Amendment provides for the rights of 
individuals to keep and bear arms. There is little support for this argument in the 
historical record. The Magna Carta of 1215 and the Petition of Rights of 1628, from 
which the Bill of Rights is derived, did not include any provisions for it. Neither did the 
17th Century English jurist and judge, William Blackstone, nor philosopher and 
physician, John Locke, known as the Father of Classical Liberalism. The writings of 
Blackstone and Locke, both of whom wrote extensively about constitutional traditions 
and natural rights, respectively, provide considerable evidence for the collective 
interpretation as opposed to the individual interpretation of the Second Amendment. 
Blackstone equated the idea of individuals employing private force as “productive of 
anarchy” and “equally fatal to civil liberty as tyranny itself.”216217 Locke emphasized the 
importance of the social contract. When an individual enters civilized society, he said, he 
gives up such power.    
The historical record of the drafting of the Second Amendment provides little 
support for the individual rights theory. The Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia 
was called to order due to the fears that a weak national government under the Articles of 
Confederation would be incapable of resisting a foreign invasion or suppressing civil 
disturbances. The Federalists who dominated the convention wanted a strong central 
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government, including a well-trained, disciplined and regulated standing army. The Anti 
Federalists, after they were resoundingly defeated, drafted 14 proposed amendments to 
the Constitution. A few of these were later incorporated into the Bill of Rights word-for-
word, but many were not, including the right to fish in navigable waters, kill game and 
bear arms for self defense. The Federalists were, however, willing to assure the anti 
federalists that the national government would not disarm the states militias. James 
Madison wrote the first draft of the Second Amendment, which read:  “A well regulated 
militia, composed of the body of the people, being the best security of a free state, the 
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; but no person religiously 
scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms.”218  Clearly referring to the states’ militias, 
the people, not individuals, have the right to bear arms.219  Much of the debate that 
followed this drafting of the Second Amendment concerned the interpretation of 
conscientious objectors’ exemption from the obligation to bear arms for the militia. 
Nowhere does the public record suggest a debate concerning the private or individual 
right to bear arms.220221 The Second Amendment debate revolved around the idea of 
limiting the power of the national government to disarm the states militias. Many 
Americans at the time feared standing armies, having been surrounded by British troops 
for decades. They hoped a well regulated militia, composed of private, part-time citizens, 
would eliminate the need for a substantial military establishment.222  The Anti-
Federalists feared the national government would eliminate the militias and thus leave 
them at the mercy of the federal government. 
The Second Amendment debate also included the role of the militias in the 
suppression of civil unrest and the level of government (federal or state) that would have 
authority to empower them. There was no plan for an armed citizenry independent of 
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government. While many states’ constitutions that were enacted during the Revolutionary 
War endorsed the right of revolution, their intent was to provide for revolt against foreign 
powers. Our Founding Fathers did not advocate such a right for their own democratic 
republic but rather an orderly transfer of power every two years.223224 
Colonial history also offers important examples of the kinds of gun regulations 
Federalists and Anti Federalists were comfortable with at the time and that were 
consistent with “the right to keep and bear arms.” New York, Philadelphia and Boston all 
restricted firing a gun within city limits. Philadelphia required a “governor’s special 
license” to discharge a gun or fireworks. Many cities and towns regulated gun powder, 
still a necessary component of an operable firearm, which in fact prevented as a practical 
matter carrying a loaded firearm into any building. A Dictionary of the English Language 
1751 (4th Edition 1773) at the time defined “bear arms” as military servitude.225    
The federal courts have consistently ruled that the Second Amendment concerns a 
well regulated militia, with the exception of one case which was later reversed.226  Before 
the Heller Case, the Supreme Court last ruled on the Second Amendment in 1939, when 
they held that the Second Amendment was “to insure the viability of state militias.”227    
The Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari to reopen the issue, but it has also 
consistently let stand lower court rulings consistent with the view that the Second 
Amendment does not convey the right to individual gun ownership.  
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The American Civil Liberties Union, which is arguably the strongest supporter of 
the Bill of Rights in America, supports the constitutionality of the right to bear arms as a 
collective, not an individual, right designed to protect the states’ rights to maintain a 
militia.228 
The American Bar Association, a nationally recognized organization of attorneys 
with more than 4,000 members, also maintains the collective-rights view that the Second 
Amendment supports states’ rights to maintain a well regulated militia.229 
The Constitution can be amended, and the courts can reinterpret the law, but 
courts have consistently found that the U.S. Constitution does not prevent sensible 
firearm regulations.230  
The Supreme Court in Heller did hold that the Second Amendment right is not 
unlimited stating: “The Court’s opinion should not be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws 
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings.”231 
G. SCIENTIFICALLY BASED FIREARMS POLICY 
The evidence strongly suggests that in order to reduce the devastating impact of 
extreme violence in educational environments, a policy of regulation is needed that 
supports a public health approach to gun violence and strictly enforces NICS 
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requirements, regular training and licensing requirements for firearm safety. Richard 
Florida conducted a study that suggests that states that have stricter gun laws have fewer 
firearm-related deaths.232  In 2007, 10.2 of every 100,000 Americans were killed with a 
firearm. States with strict gun laws, such as Hawaii, New York and New Jersey had 2.6, 
5.0 and 5.2 deaths per 100,000 people, respectively. Jurisdictions with relatively lenient 
gun laws like Louisiana and Mississippi had 20.2 and 18.5 deaths per 100,000 people, 
respectively.233    
The National Instant Criminal Background Check System, or NICS, saves lives 
and protects people by preventing guns and explosives from being purchased by 
dangerous and violent individuals. It also ensures the timely transfer of firearms to 
eligible gun owners 
Mandated by the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 and launched 
by the FBI in 1998, NICS is used by federally licensed gun dealers (Federal Firearms 
Licensees) to instantly determine whether a prospective buyer is eligible to buy firearms 
or explosives. Before handing the gun over to the customer, a Licensee must call the FBI 
or to other designated agencies to ensure that the customer does not have a criminal 
record or a history of involuntary custody in a mental health facility. More than 100 
million such checks have been made in the last decade, leading to more than 700,000 
denials. 
NICS is located in Clarksburg, West Virginia at the FBI’s Criminal Justice 
Information Services Division. Providing service to Federal Firearms Licensees in 30 
states, five U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia, the NICS requires completion of 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Form 4473. Licensees 
can contact the NICS Section via telephone or Internet through the NICS E-Check  
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System to request a background check with the descriptive information provided on the 
ATF Form 4473. NICS is customarily available 17 hours a day, seven days a week, 
including holidays.234 
H. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH 
Training requirements for gun owners should be consistent with current state law 
for others who regularly carry firearms—police officers. Gun advocates often state their 
reason for carrying a firearm is for personal safety. Understanding the psychological and 
physiological influences during a gunfight is critical. Rapid heart rate, breathing and 
shortness of breath are just three common symptoms police officers report after a 
gunfight. Add to these physiological symptoms, the fog of confusion, mental alertness, 
tunnel vision and intensity of awareness that is often reported by people in combat. Gun 
owners must be trained, qualified and confident to use such weapons. Guns are tools and 
people who want to carry them must be adequately trained to use them safely.  
Liability is an important consideration for gun owner training as well. 
Understanding of legal limits, authorities and implications of actions is essential. 
Training should also be consistent with qualification standards for the particular weapon 
owned. Semiautomatic hand guns owners should have to qualify twice a year, long gun 
and shotgun owners once a year and other semiautomatic long guns (e.g., AR-15, MP-5) 
should be restricted for law enforcement and military use only. If such a restriction is not 
politically viable, training for these weapons must be quarterly, as it is with law 
enforcement officers. 
Gun owners who do not qualify for a particular weapon should be required to 





                                                 




























VII. MENTAL HEALTH, PATHOLOGY AND THE PREVENTION 
OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE 
Individuals and organizations must be able to intervene in order to protect the 
safety of others and to assist troubled students.  
A. PREDICTABLE VIOLENCE 
Violence is often unpredictable, but studies have shown clearly that in the 
majority of school shooting incidents the shooter at some point has offered an explicit 
verbal warning. The American Medical Association estimates that nearly 50 percent of 
school-related homicides are perpetrated by students who displayed some type of 
warning sign prior to the violent event, including threats, boasts, violent stories and 
predictions.235  The individual may also show signs of depression, low tolerance for 
frustration, or a lack of resiliency when confronted by stressful situations. The individual 
may even criticize previous school shooters for their failure to inflict more casualties.236 
In over 75 percent of school shootings, other students knew beforehand about the 
troubled student’s planned event. The warning signs include direct threats, verbalizing a 
wish to kill, and bringing a weapon to school.237  The violent student may exhibit bizarre 
thoughts, delusions, hallucinations, paranoia and other disrupted mental processes, such 
as schizophrenia, as well as other mental disorders that have their initial onset in the late 
teens and early twenties.  
Physical warning signs of violent behavior include the student’s prior history of 
physical assault, bullying and being the victim of bullying, and possession of weapons.  
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The violent student may also have a history of anger, rebelliousness, irritability, 
substance abuse, social isolation and withdrawn behavior.238 The student may also have a 
history of torturing animals.  
Identifying violent students in educational environments before they act requires 
collaboration among university, mental health and law enforcement officials.239  Threat 
assessment in a campus setting involves evaluating the level of threat, assessing the 
student’s capability of carrying out the threat and determining an effective course of 
action.240  The U.S. Secret Service (USSS) identified six key principles for evaluating a 
student’s likelihood to engage in extreme violence at school. These markers include 
verbal, behavioral and physical indicators, such as loss of temper, history of violence, 
vandalism, or risk-taking behavior, carrying a weapon, and drug and alcohol use.241 The 
USSS supports the assertion that violence is predictable and rarely spontaneous; 
knowledge about the student, coupled with specific environmental and behavioral 
indicators, can prevent violence. Information about the student, personality 
characteristics, family, school and social dynamics is essential. The USSS recommends 
that the information about the student must be reliable and verifiable and based on 
objective, observable facts from multiple sources. The USSS National Threat Assessment 
Center conducted a study of school shootings and found that 34 percent of school 
shooters had a mental health evaluation prior to the attack and 17 percent had been 
diagnosed with a mental health or behavioral disorder prior to the attack.242    
Statistics reveal that firearms were the leading mechanism for homicide among 
males age 10 to 24 and that the homicide rate for youth in this age group was highest for 
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black males (55.5), more than three times higher than the next larger group, Hispanics 
(17.3) and 23 times higher for white males.243 One in 12 high school students is 
threatened or injured with a weapon each year and young people 12- to 24-years-old face 
the highest risk of being the victim of violence.244  The American Psychological 
Association has conducted a significant amount of research on violence and has 
developed 22 indicators of future violence.245   
B. CONFIDENTIALITY VS. SAFETY  
When does a psychiatrist have a duty to report a threat? There is a fine line 
between confidentiality and safety. Art Caplan, head of the New York University 
Langone Medical Center’s Division of Medical Ethics, believes the first requirement is 
certainty that harm is imminent. However, Professor Paul S. Applebaum, Director of 
Columbia University’s Center for Law, Ethics and Psychiatry, maintains that “people 
exaggerate psychiatrists’ ability to predict (violence).”246  Noting the distinction between 
people who make threats and people who pose threats, Mr. Applebaum believes the 
mental health profession is extremely vigilant about inquiring about aggressive histories 
and thoughts about harming others to determine just how firm, willful and carefully 
planned these ideas are and how likely they are to be carried out.247   
C. SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT TEAMS  
Most college and university mental health organizations’ disclosure policies are 
guided by the Tarasoff Rule, a landmark California case for therapist-patient 
confidentiality.248  It is based on a 1976 school-related homicide at the University of 
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California at Berkley. Prosinjit Podder was a graduate student who became enamored 
with Tatiana Tarasoff, a student at a nearby community college. When Ms. Tarasoff 
rejected Mr. Podder’s advances, he became depressed and sought treatment at the 
university health clinic. During counseling sessions, Mr. Podder expressed his intent to 
harm Ms. Tarasoff. The therapist notified campus police but did not notify Ms. Tarasoff, 
who was subsequently killed by Mr. Podder. The court ruled in Tarasoff vs. Regents of 
the University of California (17Cal.3d425 [1976]), that Universities have a duty to 
protect and notify victims and authorities over the duty to protect patients’ 
confidentiality.249  Specifically the ruling states: “that a patient poses a serious danger of 
violence to others…he (the counselor) bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect 
the foreseeable victim of that danger.”250  In 1985, the California legislature codified the 
Tarasoff Rule, which was extended by subsequent cases to further erode 
psychotherapeutic confidentiality.251     
Tarasoff is a California case, not a federal case, and therefore, other states are not 
bound by it. After Tarasoff, however, many states mandated a duty to warn.252  The 
American Psychological Association recommends that when a therapist determines a 
patient represents a serious danger of violence to another person, the therapist has an 
obligation to “use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against danger.”253 
Twenty-seven states imposed a duty to warn:  Arizona, California, Delaware, 
Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington and 
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Wisconsin while nine others:  Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, New York, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Texas and West Virginia, only give the therapist permission to warn. The 
other 13 states have no definitive Tarasoff Rule.254   
California has some of the toughest restrictions for gun ownership by the mentally 
ill. In California, someone held for 72 hours at a mental health facility for observation is 
barred from owning a gun for five years, and a person who threatens someone during a 
counseling session, or in front of a psychotherapist, can temporarily lose their right to buy 
a gun. California clearly places an onus of responsibility on psychotherapists to be 
diligent by asking questions about concerning and threatening behavior and reporting 
positive findings to authorities.  
When assessing a particular person’s likelihood to engage in violent behavior, 
predictions more likely to be accurate when a substantial number of variables (personal 
history of violence, verbal threats and a means to carry out those threats, etc.) are 
considered. Mental health workers must deal with threats of suicide and violence 
regularly as a part of their daily work. Professional ethics in mental health counseling 
recognizes that each client is unique, demanding flexibility, not rigidity, with respect to 
confidentiality.255  Patient confidentiality is important but not at the expense of public 
safety. Therapists and mental health counselors have an array of mechanisms to facilitate 
safety and information-sharing and should not be constrained by law or professional 
ethics to protect likely victims of violence. 
D. SCHOOL ASSESSMENT TEAMS   
School Threat Assessment Teams on college and university campuses are a 
relatively recent phenomenon that has received widespread attention, most notably since 
the 2007 Virginia Tech mass murders. Colleges and universities, leveraging workplace 
violence studies conducted by the U.S. Postal Service and others during the 1980s, have 
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implemented threat assessment teams to review reports and other indicators from 
students, faculty and staff to identify erratic, disturbing and disconcerting behavior, such 
as threats and acts of violence by individuals within the academic community. This was 
not their original intent. School assessment teams were originally formed in higher 
education in the early 1990s to identify frustrating processes and potentially violent 
students, including those who exhibited suicidal or homicidal tendencies.256 School 
assessment teams are systems of people communicating with one another to identify and 
solve problems; this concept is explained further later in this paper.  
Ursula Delworth, a former professor of counseling at the University of Iowa, 
wrote a seminal threat assessment monograph in 1989, known as the Delworth Model.257  
In it, Professor Delworth explained the rationale for using a threat assessment team:  “All 
campuses have or should have some system in place for handling the discipline or 
judicial problems and the psychological problems of students. The issue often becomes 
one of insufficient coordination, inadequate information flow and lack of a shared 
process.”258 The monograph outlines the various stages necessary to implement a threat 
assessment team, including: forming the team, defining members’ roles and 
responsibilities, conducting assessments of students’ behavior, evaluating various 
interventions and collecting relevant data.259  There are three essential components of the 
Delworth Model:  Formation of a threat assessment team, a defined assessment process 
for channeling students into the most appropriate resource, and intervention with the 
student concerned.260  This model is unique compared to other threat assessment team 
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models because it specifies the team members (faculty specialties, safety and health 
professionals), articulates the roles and responsibilities of each member, provides a 
pragmatic diagnostic tool for team members to use to assess students of concern, and 
guides team members in connecting students to the most appropriate resource.261 The 
issues confronting colleges and universities since 1989 have evolved and have become 
increasingly complex, but the Delworth model still provides a useful framework for 
developing and implementing a threat assessment team.262 
E. EVOLUTION OF SCHOOL ASSESSMENT TEAMS  
Recognizing that no one source has all the information necessary to form a 
coherent and comprehensive profile of an individual and resolve complex problems to 
mitigate risk, school assessment teams consist of members from the campus mental 
health services, campus security, student services, legal counselors, and student judicial 
disciplinary committee. These connectors represent an integrated multidisciplinary 
approach to providing objective information and solving complex problems.   
While many colleges and universities claim to have threat assessment teams, the 
research is inconclusive about how effective they are, especially when trying to 
determine when, how often and at what level threat assessment teams actually meet and 
make recommendations. Some school assessment teams represent little more than paper 
plans. Before the July 20, 2012 mass killings in Aurora, John E. Holmes, the alleged 
shooter, sought treatment at the University Health Center while a graduate student at the 
University of Colorado at Denver (he withdrew from the university on June 10, 2012). 
University Chancellor Don Elliman, refusing to discuss specifics after citing privacy 
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laws, said the school did all it could with regard to Holmes.263  In December 2011, 
following an outburst in a computer lab at Morgan State University, Baltimore City, MD, 
Alex Kinyua, a student, was evaluated by police and counselors who concluded he posed 
no threat. Months later, he was accused of killing a man and eating his heart and brain.264  
In November 2011, following repeated confrontations with faculty members, students 
and campus police, Jared Loughner, a student, was suspended from Pima County 
Community College in Tucson, AZ, pending a mental health evaluation. He subsequently 
was arrested for killing six people and injuring 16 others in the assassination attempt on 
Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords.265  
F. HIGH-RISK INDIVIDUALS 
A recent report released on October 25, 2012 by John Hopkins Bloomberg School 
of Public Policy, which examines policies and methods for reducing gun violence, 
synthesized a number of previous studies to compile a list of the best ways to reduce gun 
violence in America. These methods include: Prohibiting high-risk individuals from 
having guns and restricting easy access to guns with large capacity magazines. High-risk 
individuals in the report are identified as criminals, domestic violence perpetrators, 
youths, substance abusers and those who are mentally ill. The report also found that so-
called “right to carry” do not reduce gun violence. 
Federal law bars access to guns, if a court determines that someone is mentally ill, 
or if they have been involuntarily committed to a mental health institution. The National 
Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), mandated by the Brady Handgun 
Violence Prevention Act of 1993 and administered by the FBI, is a federal database with 
the names of mentally ill people barred from buying guns. NICS lacks millions of records 
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because many states have not submitted the required mental health records. Both Virginia 
Tech’s Cho and Northern Illinois University’s Kazmierczak should have been barred 
from buying guns had their names been submitted to NICS. 
Since Mr. Cho’s rampage in 2007, the state of Virginia has submitted more than 
170,000 records of people with mental illnesses and Texas has submitted 190,000, but 21 
other states have reported fewer than 100 records. The Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) examined why states are not submitting records.266  The Department of Justice 
reported that technological, legal, and coordination challenges hinder states’ ability to 
make mental health records available. 
GAO recommended that DOJ share best practices in making mental health 
records accessible to those making inquiries. GAO also examined the effectiveness of 
reward and penalty programs and how to best implement them. Technological barriers, 
like the switch from paper-based to digital computer systems, have been cited frequently 
as a common cause. Some states contend it violates their state laws to forward mental 
health records to the federal database. A few states are changing their laws in order to 
comply. 
From 2004 to 2011, the total number of mental health records that states made 
available to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) increased 
from 126,000 to 1.2 million, an 852 percent increase. To address the technological 
challenges, the Department of Justice (DOJ) provides assistance, such as grants and 
training. DOJ has also begun to encourage states to share their promising best practices at 
conferences, seminars and other forums, but it has not distributed such practices 
nationally, a step that could further assist states’ efforts.  
The vast majority of records made available to NICS are criminal records that 
cannot be readily disaggregated from other records in the databases checked by NICS. 
Unlawful drug use records are unavailable to NICS, as are records related to positive 
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drug tests by convicted felons, parolees and persons placed on probation. This 
information gaps remain an area of great concern.  
On May 1, 2012, DOJ data revealed that 30 states were not making noncriminal 
records available, including mental health records. Several states raised objections about 
providing records without a court order while two states reported they did not have the 
centralized databases needed to collect and share these records. DOJ officials were 
unsure if the records, as currently configured, could reach the level of precision needed to 
serve as the basis for implementing the provisions. 
Six states had mixed views on the extent to which the reward and penalty 
provisions of the 2007 act would provide incentives for them to make more records 
available.  
G. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Colleges and universities share a collective burden and communal responsibility 
for the safety and security of all of their members. Creating an atmosphere of personal 
accountability and shared responsibility is the essence of safe communities. Theodore 
Roosevelt captured this sentiment when he said: “To educate a person in the mind but not 
in morals is to educate a menace to society.” This philosophy is also consistent with 
Aristotle’s admonition:  “Educating the mind without educating the heart is no education 
at all.” Colleges and universities must do a better job educating students, faculty and staff 
about the importance of shared responsibility.  
School Assessment Teams should have the power and authority to consider and 
address the entire universe of college life that negatively impacts students, faculty and 
staff. They should be led by the school president and evaluate programs, policies, sources 
of frustration and other parts of the system where people have a tendency to fall through 
the cracks or perform badly. They should listen to and address community members’ 
dissatisfaction with processes, constraints and policies, as well as take note of 




Such a model program would begin during the college application and selection 
process when students are required to report substantive information about themselves, as 
well as information about their demeanor and attitudes. The program would continue 
through orientation, freshman and sophomore years and culminate with a senior project 
to assess the course and trajectory of one’s life, career plans and strategies for the future. 
School assessment team programs would include writing workshops and counseling 
programs to provide insight and guidance into the development and nurturing of every 
student.  
A program such as this may not eliminate violence on college campuses 
completely but in the words of the colorful, Italian legal reformer, Enrico Ferry (1856–
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VIII. POLICE RESPONSE TO EXTREME VIOLENCE IN 
EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION TO POLICE RESPONSE 
On April 20, 1999, when Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris systematically shot and 
killed 13 people at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, police leaders across 
the nation immediately realized that the policies and tactics guiding the emergency 
response to these situations were terribly flawed.268   
When police first arrived at the high school, sheriff’s deputies exchanged gunfire 
with the suspects outside of the school. The suspects, who were not injured, took cover 
by fleeing inside the school building. Officers requested additional units, established a 
perimeter and a command post and awaited specially trained tactical officers. Once safely 
back inside the high school, Klebold and Harris went on a murderous shooting rampage. 
They shot 34 more students, killing 10 students plus a teacher, who bled to death 
awaiting assistance, as more than 1,000 police officers assembled outside.269  The killers 
committed suicide before the tactical officers had engaged them.270  
The Columbine tragedy triggered a fundamental shift in thinking and approach for 
law enforcement responding to an armed gunman actively shooting unarmed civilians.271  
Columbine prompted one of the largest and most sweeping changes in police training, 
operations and tactics:  Active shooter tactical police training for patrol officers.272 
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This was not the first time a school shooting prompted law enforcement to 
reevaluate tactics. In 1966, Charles Whitman, armed with an arsenal of weapons, climbed 
to the observation deck  atop the 27-story  University of Texas Tower in Austin and fired 
unimpeded for 96 minutes, killing 14 people and injuring 32 others.273  Whitman’s 
actions prompted law enforcement organizations nationwide to explore the adoption of 
military tactics and create Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units. 
Virginia Tech, the scene of another devastating school shooting in 2007, shifted 
the police paradigm once again and engaged the “whole of community” approach in the 
police response to active shooter incidents. The details of the Virginia Tech murders, as 
well as the rampage school shootings at Northern Illinois University, were covered in a 
previous chapter of this thesis.  
B. TACTICAL POLICE RESPONSE 
The history of police response to school shootings has become increasingly 
technical and complex. Since the University of Texas shootings and the development of 
police SWAT units, emergency service units, rescue units, as well as the availability of 
elaborate active shooter training, police response to school shootings has received 
considerable attention.  
1. Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) 
SWAT units, as the name suggests, brought a considerable higher level of skill, 
training, resources and equipment into the field of policing. While there are many 
different genres, these units essentially apply military tactics, techniques and precision to 
the police discipline. The officers also began to carry heavy weapons, long guns and 
shotguns, breeching tools and armor as part of their patrol equipment. As the special 
weapons teams evolved, they began to have less of a role in patrol operations and instead 
focused on training and responding to calls that required specialized skill-sets and 
equipment. When this became cost-prohibitive for many police departments, part-time 
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teams, often referred to as Mobile Response Teams (MRT), became more popular. MRT 
members carry specialized equipment in the trunks of their patrol vehicles and many 
units train two or three times per month.  
2. Evolution of Emergency Service Units 
Emergency Service Units were a natural progression of specialized response 
teams and constrained budgets that took on more of a technical, as well as a tactical role 
in responding to vehicle accidents, elevator emergencies and special rescue missions, 
such as jumpers, vehicle and construction accidents, and emotionally disturbed persons. 
Due to the sometimes considerable delay in ESU response times, as policing 
strategies became more and more complex, patrol officers often needed and began to 
carry specialized training and equipment. Many began to carry, for instance, rudimentary 
breeching tools, such as knives, crow bars, sledge hammers, bolt cutters and wedges. 
Many police departments across the country also began arming patrol officers with 
shotguns and long guns, such as patrol rifles and carbines. 
Columbine forced the evolution of patrol tactics once again. No longer could 
police idly stand by and wait for specialized police teams when a gunman was actively 
killing people. Active shooter training was initiated and quickly spread to all 50 states.  
3. Active Shooters 
Active shooter training is a response technique whereby responding patrol officers 
await the arrival of two or three fellow patrol officers, form an element, and tactically 
enter a location to stop the killing. Over the past decade, these tactics, training and 
policies have been refined considerably. Research has also indicated that the wait for 
other patrol officers to form an element may be too long as well. Studies reveal that less 
than two percent of school shootings end due to police action.274  Solo entry is the latest 
police tactic to be taught and utilized to thwart active shooters engaged in killing people.  
                                                 




Solo entry techniques teach police officers the requirements and skills necessary 
to engage an active shooter one on one. Solo entry officers must have an indication that 
the shooter is actively engaged in killing, that there are victims present and that 
immediate action is necessary to stop the killing of innocent people. Solo entry officers 
are trained to be on the lookout for multiple perpetrators, the potential for ambush and the 
likelihood of improvised explosive devices. Solo entry does not fit every active shooter 
scenario.    
Since 90 percent of all law enforcement agencies nationwide have 50 or fewer 
sworn personnel, one or two officers may be the only ones working a particular shift or at 
a particular time. In order to respond effectively in those first critical minutes to save 
lives and stop the killing, police officers must immediately confront and neutralize the 
offender.275 
4. Solo Active Shooter Training 
Solo officer active shooter training usually consists of a variety of disciplines 
necessary to overcome the many operational challenges confronting the first responding 
officer. Noise, confusion, mass casualties and panic characterize the environment of an 
active shooter. Training objectives include not only eliminating the threat but necessary 
preparation and planning activities. These activities typically include developing a 
familiarity with the environment, building plans and physical barriers, vulnerability 
assessments, community engagement activities and provision of technology, such as 
smart phones for data, schematic and picture transmission. 
Active shooter policies, procedures and regulations are administrative guidelines 
for responding police officers or the police department. The National Tactical Officers 
Association (NTOA) recommends that officers responding to an active shooter incident 
use any legal means at their disposal to engage the active shooter, including arrest, 
containment, and the use of objectively reasonable force to stop the suspect from killing 
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and injuring others. The philosophy guiding police policy is that the active shooter must 
be stopped before s/he can take any more innocent lives. The first responding officer has 
a duty to use any legal means to accomplish this. The officer’s duties, in order of 
importance, include: Stopping the active shooter who is actively killing, rescuing victims, 
providing medical assistance and preserving the crime scene. While it is important to 
provide medical assistance, it is the duty of law enforcement officers to protect innocent 
life by stopping the actions of an active shooter.276 
Training for active shooter events includes room-entry techniques, building-
clearing methods, victim rescue strategies and recognition of explosives and improvised 
explosive devices.  
The tactics include formation of an element or Contact Team, likely to engage the 
active shooter. The team consists of up to four police officers (or deputies) in immediate 
pursuit of the active shooter. Their mission is to make contact with the active shooter as 
soon as possible and stop the active shooter by arrest, containment or the use of force. 
Subject to 360-degree vulnerability, the contact team must be cognizant of doors, 
windows and other building features likely to conceal the suspect. They will continue 
past victims and harmless distractions until the threat is eliminated but will note and relay 
to rescue teams the locations of victims. 
Contingencies are discussed and recommended during training exercises should 
an officer become incapacitated due to injury or mental distress, such as observing the 
injury of a loved one, family member or friend. 
5. Rescue Teams 
The Rescue Team consists of the next arriving four officers (or deputies) who will 
locate and remove injured victims and direct uninjured victims to safety. Rescue team 
members must remain vigilant to the rapidly changing dynamics of the incident, and they 
too must remain cognizant that are subject to 360 degree vulnerability. 
                                                 




If either team encounters a suspected explosive device, they must rely on their 
knowledge, skill and experience to determine if they should approach or bypass it. 
Reporting its type, location and other descriptive features is critical to the safety of all 
responding officers, including those on the scene and those yet to arrive. Barricades and 
other delaying features should be approached with extreme caution. 
C. PROMISING APPROACHES TO ENHANCING A TACTICAL POLICE 
RESPONSE 
There are several promising approaches on the horizon for enhancing police 
planning and response to extreme violence. Though not specifically created for school 
shootings, these preparations are clearly applicable and relevant and would undoubtedly 
be engaged should an active shooter event occur on a college or university campus, 
particularly if it were part of a larger attack or similar to the international terrorist school 
attacks described earlier.   
One such method was proposed in a workshop hosted by the Department of 
Homeland Security.277 
In the fourth quarter of 2010, 70 participants representing 16 state and local 
jurisdictions met in Monterey, California to develop a workshop series that would be 
useful for agencies developing plans for responding to a multiple targeted attack similar 
to the attack that occurred in Mumbai, India in November 2008. The object of the 
workshop was to delineate key objectives in police response capabilities, resources and 
authorities. The first priority was to identify available resources including grants, subject 
matter experts, and technical advice to address gaps in capabilities, resources and legal 
knowledge. Participants also sought to evaluate existing policies, plans and procedures to 
identify best practices. Workshop participants sought to stimulate new ideas that would 
encourage situational awareness and improve information sharing. Another key objective  
 
 
                                                 




was to identify and improve joint first responder training to counter a complex attack. 
Also considered were opportunities to advance interoperable communications and 
participation by private sector partners.  
The rationale for the workshops was to identify state and local governments’ 
resources and preparedness levels in response to a complex situation similar to the 2008 
Mumbai attack. That attack took place over several days and was carried out by small 
teams of well-armed, well-trained, and highly motivated individuals assaulting “soft 
targets.” Such multiple target attacks can be extremely effective: The Mumbai attack 
killed 164 people. The seminars were conducted in venues across the country and 
highlighted a number of common challenges, specific to the host cities’ ability to respond 
to a complex attack. The attack scenarios were tailored to the host city and were 
organized, coordinated, and involved multiple targets.  
While these seminars highlighted a number of important and emerging trends, the 
discussion centered on: planning and coordination, training and equipment, 
communications, public-private sector participation, public messaging, intelligence and 
information sharing, legal and policy issues, and life support. These subjects explored 
throughout the homeland security enterprise mirror the areas of concern in preventing and 
responding to school shootings.  
D. COMPREHENSIVE RESPONSE PLANS 
Seminar participants discovered that municipalities lack comprehensive response 
plans to address and respond to complex attacks and fail to include college and university 
communities in their planning activities. The first step in preparing for such an event is a 
comprehensive, written, unified, multi-agency, complex attack response plan that 
accounts for multiple events at a variety of sites and one that considers the impact of 
multiple active shooters, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and resultant fires and 
extensive injuries and casualties. Participants found that many of the participating 
jurisdictions have emergency management plans that focus on natural disasters or 




Each of the participants identified the need for a unified response plan that articulates the 
coordinated response of multiple jurisdictions, agencies, departments and resources.278  
The workshop participants suggested a multi-agency unified response plan that 
establishes roles and responsibilities for command and control, communications protocols 
and procedures among all first responders. A unified response plan must take into 
account local, state and federal assets. Emergency planners may also want to consider the 
complex environment of a time-sensitive, multifaceted attack and ensure that plans 
highlight key decisions, agency leads or authorities with the responsibility for decision-
making, the timing of these decisions, and how the decisions will be communicated and 
to whom. The aim is that these plans are jointly exercised with all responding 
departments and agencies. 
The study also found current emergency plans provide a good foundation upon 
which cities can develop complex attack response plans. Comprehensive emergency 
management plans integrate police, fire, EMS, social services, and other agencies. A 
terrorism annex could be added to address multiple targeted complex attacks that include 
schools, colleges and universities as well as houses of worships, hotels and performance 
venues. All are soft targets and conducive to terrorist attacks. Other jurisdictions may 
also wish to consider evacuation procedures, public messaging and other protocols that 
would be well-suited for inclusion in a complex attack response plan. 
E. COORDINATION CHALLENGES 
The study discovered a myriad of coordination challenges that arise when 
multiple jurisdictions activate several command and Emergency Operations Centers at 
the same time during an emergency. Multi-agency response plans that clearly identify 
roles and responsibilities may address these complications through a pre-established and 
agreed-upon structure, as well as a location for the immediate standup of a Unified 
Command Center (UCC) that can serve as an Area Command Post to facilitate the 
management of resource requests coming from incidents at multiple locations. 
                                                 




Participants found that jurisdictional leaders need clearly defined and tested roles and 
responsibilities during a complex attack. Decision makers from federal, state and local 
resources, who will likely play an important role during an emergency incident, will 
benefit from understanding each entity’s policies, procedures and protocols. Regular 
coordination exercises can improve this understanding as well.279  
Regularly scheduled joint exercises with coordinated responding agencies can 
also address priorities and key decisions, including identifying staging areas and 
establishing future and ongoing roles and responsibilities. Key community members and 
decision makers are called upon to do a lot. Many of these planning activities should be 
coordinated at regular, frequent and specific intervals, such as quarterly or semi annually, 
so that each participating member and decision maker knows scheduling requirements 
well in advance. The agenda should also include other related areas of responsibility such 
as natural disasters, and other smaller emergencies.  
By addressing the high-risk, low-probability event, events that are more likely but 
present lower risk will be handled more smoothly. 
F. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS 
Emergency Operations Centers (EOC), commonly used for natural disasters and 
special events, take time to be fully staffed and function optimally during an emergency. 
Participants noted that these centers need to be exercised and tested for no-notice events 
to ensure rapid start-up at optimal efficiency.  
The seminar participants also recommended a singular, commonly understood, 
cross-jurisdictional credentialing system that would ensure that authorized public and 
private sector personnel would have access to law enforcement-controlled sites. 
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G. COMMON OPERATING PICTURE 
During terrorist events, municipalities need the ability to quickly formulate a 
Common Operating Picture (COP) to assemble, assign and organize assets. Dispatchers 
and operations center personnel must be able to gather and assess attack site information, 
as well as monitor the availability and allocation of assets.  
Geospatial COP tools help cities electronically track their assets and share 
information with partners. If accessible through an EOC, a COP enables leaders to make 
decisions more effectively. Multiple agencies may need access to the system.  
Several cities were found to utilize commercial tools to develop a COP, as well as 
grant access to jurisdictions. Virtual Command Post and WebEOC are two examples of a 
web-based emergency operation centers used by many cities to share and manage 
information. A federal government-sponsored, no-cost COP tool is also available through 
the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN).  
Surveys of participants indicated that joint first responder training is a common 
concern across agencies. Police, Fire, and EMS require integrated training programs for a 
complex attack scenario in which services are delivered concurrently within a hostile 
operating theater. 
The seminars found that while many agencies have jointly coordinated training 
programs, opportunities exist to expand joint training exercises, particularly among EMS 
and SWAT units.  
They also found that while most cities regularly plan and train for traditional 
active shooter attacks, most training programs are designed to engage only isolated, 
singular, active shooters, rather than the challenges of confronting multiple well-trained 
and well-equipped attackers at more than one site. Each participating police department 




H. MULTI-ASSAULT COUNTER TERRORISM ACTION CAPABILITIES 
Some jurisdictions were also found to be taking advantage of existing 
opportunities incorporating elements of other jurisdictions’ Multi-Assault Counter 
Terrorism Action Capabilities (MACTAC) courses, anticipating that those trained will 
train others. Other jurisdictions worked with a curriculum development company to 
create their own multi-shooter course.  
MACTAC is a training paradigm that ensures that multiple law enforcement 
agencies can assemble, organize and respond quickly as a team to confront extraordinary 
events in multiple locations with deadly force. As developed by the Las Vegas Police 
Department, MACTAC is a multiple modal police tactic that quickly adapts from a 
community policing model to a traditional police tactical team model to confront 
emerging threats through localized leadership and decentralized command and control 
operations. MACTAC incidents are extraordinary events that exceed conventional law 
enforcement capabilities, including terrorist attacks, active shooters, multiple improvised 
explosive devices, hostage situations, and heavily armed adversaries. MACTAC features 
ad hoc tactical teams for swift deployment and immediate execution, focusing on 
seamless interagency coordination.  
The JCTAWS report found that many police departments do not issue advanced 
weapons and equipment. The departments that do have carbines for patrol officers do not 
have department-issued optics for their weapons.280 Each police department identified the 
need to have optics or magnifiers to mount on their weapons to engage attackers 
accurately from a safe distance. This argument notwithstanding, there is no safe distance 
to engage an active shooter or any armed adversary and few police officers are trained 
with weapons at greater than 25 yards, the equivalent of a “Hail Mary” pass in football. 
Police officers cannot be reasonably expected to perform techniques they are rarely 
trained to do.  
                                                 




Another concern with this and other advanced tactical operations is the high level 
of physical fitness required by operators (police officers) to execute these techniques. 
Without a physical training regimen consistent with the required skill set, the value of 
these tactics and training is questionable.  
Additionally, JCTAWS seminar participants determined that first responders 
(Police, Fire, and EMS) lack appropriate ballistic protection. Many participants stated a 
desire to use DHS funding streams to purchase optics and other equipment, but policies 
prohibit purchasing weapons or weapons’ accessories with DHS grant funds.  
FEMA’s National Preparedness Division is coordinating with the Department of 
Defense’s excess property program to develop a way of providing equipment that has 
been identified for responding to a multi-site complex attack.281  
First responders continue to face a myriad of challenges with radio 
communications, especially cross jurisdictional wireless communications among federal, 
state, regional, and local partners. Interoperability between multi-agency tactical teams 
and incident commands remains a critical issue. 
A solution to this dilemma is well overdue. Jurisdictions have found the quickest 
and easiest way to address this matter is to provide key leaders pre-programmed radios 
with the channels used for communicating.282  Another challenge is getting enough 
radios to the right places, at the right time and to the right leaders during a complex 
attack. When the foregoing strategy is implemented, this problem will be resolved. 
Tactical teams also need to develop a universal sign language that is trained and clearly 
understood by all members. 
Seminar participants found that jurisdictions can benefit from training and 
exercising pre-established multi-agency and multiple site communications plans that can 
be implemented on short notice.  
                                                 





They also found that a communications plan should account for up to six 
locations and address dedicated channels to talk back to dispatch centers. Each incident 
site should have a dedicated channel, so multi-agency responders can communicate 
directly with their Incident Command Post. A communications plan should also include 
contingencies in the event that networks are inaccessible.  
First responders rely heavily on cellular telephone systems. For many, it is the 
primary method of contacting employees to report to work during an emergency. At the 
workshops, cellular service providers acknowledged that cellular systems will be 
overloaded and severely degraded in the initial hours of an attack.  
Response plans must account for cellular service disruption or failure. Text 
messaging is more resilient and likely to work when voice services do not. 
Cell Sites on Wheels (COWs) can provide additional cellular capacity, although 
they take considerable time to set up. The participants also suggested that appropriate 
officials obtain Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and 
Wireless Priority Service (WPS) cards that will provide them with priority access on 
cellular networks. 
Perhaps most closely aligned with one of the central concepts of this thesis is to 
include whole-of-the community engagement. In planning activities, the seminar 
participants discovered that jurisdictions are not fully aware of the depth and breadth of 
private sector capabilities that are available. 
I. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
PROMISING PRACTICES 
School shootings have driven the advancement of police tactics for years. Police 
tactics have evolved considerably since the first mass murder in an educational 
environment in 1966. Over the past 46 years, tactics, equipment, planning and 
preparation have improved dramatically. SWAT, ESU and Active Shooter techniques 




Recommendations for local outreach to explain how to effectively develop and 
disseminate information and to help the public better understand its roles and 
responsibilities in preventing such events is an area of needed improvement. Engaging 
the public makes a difference. Community residents, students and employees, as well as 
local businesses offer important insights and untapped resources for police officers and 
police response strategies. They likely take the same route to work and school every day, 
eat lunch in the same areas and frequent the same stores. They know students and local 
people, and they are keenly aware of changes in people and environments. In short, they 
know their work environments better than anyone. 
Police departments must emphasize strategies that improve communications with 
the communities they serve, as well as stimulate community awareness. When 
developing local active shooter programs and training officers, the community must be a 
part of the planning process and training activities. Embracing a sense of personal and 
civic responsibility and acknowledgement that law enforcement cannot do it alone are 
essential components of community safety. Community-oriented policing strategies are 
among the most effective measures of making students, faculty, staff and residents more 
comfortable talking to the police and engaging in public safety planning activities. 
University meetings and advisory committees give students, faculty, staff and residents a 
forum to express their concerns and proffer innovative ideas. Encouraging university 
community leaders, faith-based groups and community organizations to engage and 
participate in problem-solving activities that touch on themes broader than extreme 
violence is important as well. University public safety departments that solicit feedback 
have better opportunities to remain informed and improve the likelihood of success. 
Learning from past mistakes, tracking successes and areas for improvement stimulates 
community interaction and addresses future capabilities as well.  
Resources for implementation of these recommendations could be provided 
through training grants provided by a consortium of Department of Homeland Security, 
Federal Emergency Management Administration and the Department of Education. Local 




Officers (SRO) program and supplemented by specially trained personnel and supervisors 
from Emergency Service, Emergency Operations and SWAT units. The combination of 
SRO and ESU personnel is not only an impressive and effective skill-set for all police 
officers but a force multiplier for budget-constrained police departments. 
However, School Resource Officers are usually well-trained, affable and 
engaging police officers selected for their interpersonal, not their tactical skill. This is an 
unfortunate and sometimes deadly consequence of the current SRO program.  
An important consideration in evaluating the response resources of tactical units 
is that if adversaries were to strike a school as part of a multiple targeted coordinated 
attack many police departments’ response capability, including elite Emergency Service 
Units and SWAT teams, would be exhausted upon dispatch to the first or second event. 
The increased specialization of expertise within police departments contributes to the 
Paradox of Enrichment, meaning that as the ESU and SWAT teams become more and 
more specialized, they are enriched to the extent that duty not requiring their exceptional 
skill is viewed as unimportant and therefore a low priority. Competitive Exclusion occurs 
when patrol officers who are not as skillfully trained as ESU, but who are well trained to 
handle an array of situations and numerically much stronger than ESU and SWAT, are 
confronted with an armed adversary. In such a situation, they are unlikely to engage an 
enemy that may be easily be defeated at their skill level and will instead elect to call in 
back-up from the tactical units. This phenomenon has occurred before, recurring in the 
1999 Columbine killings and 2008 Mercaz HaRav Yeshiva shooting, when innocent 
people were killed and wounded after the arrival of armed police officers who awaited 
specially trained tactical officers. This often results in a tremendous emotional burden on 
police officers who did not take immediate action and who often carry these scars for the 





















IX. IMPLEMENTING A STRATEGIC PLAN TO REDUCE 
EXTREME VIOLENCE IN EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS 
A. ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT 
Extreme violence in America must be addressed at the highest levels of 
government that have the clout to advocate and implement a clear agenda. This 
monograph recommends that the president of the United States assemble the necessary 
resources to address this pernicious problem. The president can do this by rallying the 
attention and conviction of the American people. Through academic rigor and scientific 
scholarship, the American public must be informed to understand the nature and extent of 
gun violence and the reasonable measures that can and must be advanced to prevent 
wonton violence and the senseless deaths of 30,000 Americans per year. Academia is 
well situated to fulfill a vital leadership role in this regard, similar to that of the American 
Medical Association 50 years ago when it championed automobile safety. The dismissive 
response by the NRA to the president’s request for a meeting to discuss sensible gun 
policy following the Aurora shootings should not be met with political reprisal, but 
instead should be met with confidence, conviction and certainty that their unwillingness 
to discuss the problem will not prevent it from being rectified. The public must demand 
that Congress prioritize sensible gun legislation.  
The president would direct the Department of Justice, Department of Education 
and the Department of Homeland Security to collaborate and craft competent policies that 
protect all Americans from the dangers of extreme violence, especially in educational 
environments. The president will direct the Center for Disease Control to conduct 
research and distribute this research widely across an array of disciplines. 
The Department of Justice will convene its considerable resources under the 
leadership of the Attorney General to lead the FBI to identify trends and patterns of gun 
trafficking and criminal conduct involving firearms, with a focus on eliminating 
knowledge gaps. Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives will inspect and enforce 




produce safer weapons and other products and provide details about the disposition, sale 
and transfer of such products. They will also audit gun sales everywhere guns are sold. 
U.S. Attorneys will be trained to prosecute cases and legislation enacted to close loop 
holes. 
School shootings on college campuses are extremely complex events. They are 
described as “Black Swans,” a term popularized by author Nicholas Taleb that describes 
high-risk and low-probability events with tragic consequences that resist easy resolution. 
Although rare, often unpredictable and difficult to solve, they demand careful 
consideration and our full attention because they are deadly and devastating to victims, 
survivors, families, communities, and to society at large. Preventing these attacks is a 
matter of national security.   
This thesis has examined an array of contributing factors that abet school 
shootings, as well as a number of realistic countermeasures to prevent such shootings in 
the future and to reduce the devastating consequences when they do occur. The 
complexity of school shootings requires that they be solved obliquely.283  Many of these 
contributing solutions and countermeasures require hard work and creativity on planning 
and preparation, as well as innovation and adaptability. They also require a fundamental 
shift in the paradigms governing our thinking about appropriate prevention and response 
strategies.  
By far, the single most important factor in preventing and reducing school 
shootings is sensible gun legislation proposed by a public health approach to gun safety. 
A public health approach is a proactive community oriented method that focuses directly 
on prevention; eliminating the problem before something goes wrong. Specific 
recommendations that logically follow from this approach are outlined in the final section 
of this thesis.   
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As a profession, law enforcement must do a much better job at not just 
community outreach but community engagement. This engagement starts with 
recruitment and selection of only the highest caliber of police officer candidates who can 
contribute in a meaningful way to the success of the organization. The ideal candidate is a 
person who knows and understands human interactions and is resistive to the negative 
influences of policing that often creates barriers between people. Police candidates must 
understand the mission and meaning of “To Protect and Serve” and the consequences of 
public safety, which often comes at the officer’s peril. After hiring the right people, the 
right training is paramount to insure that all police officers at every rank have the 
requisite knowledge, skills and ability to effectively engage the communities they are 
sworn to protect and serve. Training must constantly evolve as threats and tactics change. 
Adequate supervision must be maintained to monitor performance and ensure compliance 
with the highest ideals of ethical, moral and professional standards. 
Educators must closely examine the opportunities that exist for partnerships and 
embrace professional disciplines that are outside the realm of traditional academia—
disciplines like counseling services, public safety, and security. Each can contribute to a 
better understanding, enhanced training and improved preparation for these terrible 
events. Educators must be innovative and open to divergent thinking and opportunities to 
engage others, and most of all, they must be transparent and accountable. School 
Assessment Teams must be authorized to examine a litany of policies, processes and 
people to prevent instances of extreme school violence. 
Mental health professionals must investigate better opportunities to actively 
engage people in crisis and hold their engagement until the crisis is resolved. This 
requires advocating for resources, new policies, and better training. It also requires 
regular self-care among mental health professionals to reduce the incidence of depression 
and burn-out.    
The best performers in music, art and sports continue to practice throughout their 





enforcement professionals. The correct approach to strategic implementation of 
recommendations to prevent and respond to school shootings requires three guiding 
principles described below. 
B. ADOPTING A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH 
A public health approach focuses exclusively on prevention. Public health 
approaches focus on a change in the environment to influence individual behavior. Gun 
violence in America is a public health epidemic and preventing it requires collective 
responsibility.   
As David Hemenway notes, the public health community recognized that 
advocacy based on sound scientific evidence is essential for social justice issues to gain 
standing.284  Injury prevention is a public health priority.  
A public health approach to gun violence, however, requires public and political 
support for collective responsibility similar to that mobilized for environmental concerns, 
anti-smoking campaigns, and vehicle safety. Public health solutions have historically 
relied on governmental action to defeat organized opposition:  Although water borne 
illnesses were rampant in New York City in the 19th century, the construction of the New 
York City water supply was extremely controversial and strongly opposed by organized 
groups of land owners. In the 1950s and 60s, when it became clear that tobacco use had a 
deleterious effect on smokers’ health, cigarette manufacturers strongly opposed 
limitations on tobacco use. As traffic fatalities sky rocketed in the 1950s and 60s, vehicle 
manufacturers fiercely opposed seat belts and other safety devices.  
Rational public policy can work. Gun advocates have perpetuated a dichotomous 
world view that is both flawed and dysfunctional. They view the world as good and bad 
with only good guys and bad guys in it. To suggest a rational gun policy is to strip them 
of their guns. Because of this bipolar view, the gun lobby aims to create a society with 
virtually no firearm restrictions. This polarization results in irrational arguments that 
permeate the gun lobby. A public health approach aggregates rather than segregates and 
                                                 




focuses on prevention rather than fault-finding. Scientific evidence suggests that a 
substantial number of murders, suicides and unintentional firearm-related injuries and 
death can be prevented with reasonable gun policies.285 
A public health approach neither marginalizes nor stigmatizes any one group. 
Reframing gun violence as a medical issue focuses on preventing such tragedies through 
education, accountability, product safety and improved standards. A public health 
approach promotes a wide variety of social, environmental and individual interventions, 
disciplines and institutions. It uses science rather than belief and broadens the issue to 
focus on all firearm injuries and not solely on crime.  
Perhaps most importantly, a public health approach emphasizes many reasonable 
and beneficial interventions that can reduce gun violence. It brings a pragmatic, scientific 
and objective medical model to research in order to find innovative and effective 
solutions to complex problems. Such a model replaces the fatalistic and complacent 
belief that nothing can be done to reduce firearm-related injuries and death.286 
C. POLICE ENGAGEMENT: DEVELOPING OPERATIONAL ART 
In order for the police to remain relevant and contribute in meaningful ways to the 
prevention and response to school shootings on college campuses, they must possess the 
capabilities, capacities and skill sets necessary to engage the community more deeply. No 
longer can police officers afford the either/or paradigm but must possess both 
interpersonal and tactical skill. Police commanders must ensure officers of every rank 
have the training and mental fortitude required to engage people and perpetrators.  
Police commanders must also have the authority, capacity and capability to 
engage and solicit information and support from all sectors and members of the 
community. She/he must be realistic about the level of support, time constraints, 
competing demands and allegiances of community members. Police commanders must 
collaborate with colleagues, other agencies and jurisdictions, educators and mental health 
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professionals to develop comprehensive strategies for public safety, prevention and 
response. Police commanders must advocate for and maintain training regimens that 
include all of the skill-sets required for twenty first century policing, including 
interpersonal dexterity and tactical proficiency in an array of complex settings and 
environments. The current paradigm of once or twice yearly firearm qualification cycles 
does not fulfill the requirements of survivability training necessary to develop these 
extraordinary skill-sets of engagement, well-being and tactical effectiveness.   
Developing “operational art”287 in law enforcement is to cultivate the capability 
to transition away from binary law enforcement, the either/or concepts of policing, such 
as community police officer or tactical operations specialist and moving toward 
transitional identities.288 Organizations need to develop and support operational art 
through the development of policies and training programs that evolve as the law, threats 
and technology evolve. The current concept of managing one tactical situation at a time is 
no longer relevant and must be replaced with the extended capacity to influence multiple 
incidents in multiple locations simultaneously. Innovation and technology support these 
objectives. Operational art requires elegant choreography, sophisticated coordination, and 
intelligent information sharing.  
Police officers must be confident in their training, capabilities and 
accomplishments. They must be given opportunities to engage and lead groups that take 
them beyond their comfort zones. Police officers must recognize the nuances and 
differences between an authority figure and community leader because their role is today 
more closely aligned with the latter than the former.  
The degree of unpredictability of active shooter events on college campuses is 
extraordinary and can only be addressed through regular and frequent training 
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opportunities. University leaders must also understand their role and responsibility to 
better protect college communities through adequate resource allocation and training 
opportunities that can be leveraged against the natural role and tutorial settings of the 
university environment. All universities should share their commitment to education 
through tuition assistance, fellowships and grants with federal, state and local police 
officers with an emphasis on local issues. Creating a safe learning environment is 
everyone’s responsibility. 
The importance of training for unpredictable events cannot be overstated. 
Training is often one of the first casualties in difficult financial times. Training, however, 
must be woven into the very fabric of operations because it is essential to the effective 
functioning of police. Creative delivery of this training must be facilitated by labor and 
management agreement. Weaving training into daily blocks of patrol officers’ activities 
may be challenging, but the rewards far exceed the costs in terms of lives saved, injuries 
averted and other potential consequences.289  Experienced and effective trainers must be 
shared and a bartering system developed between agencies to use talented trainers more 
efficiently.  
D. IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES: PLANNING, PREPARATION AND 
COORDINATION ACTIVITIES NEEDED FOR EFFECTIVE POLICE 
RESPONSE 
Educators, public safety professionals and community leaders are squandering 
opportunities to prevent horrific acts of extreme violence in educational environments 
and communities. Preparedness is derived by planning, which is critical to mobilizing 
resources when needed. Planning increases the opportunities to identify full spectrum 
resources to address the chaos, confusion and casualties caused by incidents of extreme 
violence in university environments. Leadership must display a willingness to share 
resources and cross-pollinate the threat environment with innovative and effective 
solutions to complex campus problems. Labor unions must take a leadership role in 
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providing their membership life-sustaining tactics through training. They must 
understand that people’s lives are at stake, and they must do everything possible to ensure 
their members have the best training and latest survival strategies to confront these 
deadly threats at reasonable cost to universities and communities. 
There is a very keen awareness that not even the largest universities and police 
departments can deal with incidents of extreme violence by themselves. Regional 
planning and resource allocation is essential across jurisdictions and disciplines. 
Budget priorities evolve and are driven by what elected officials view as 
important at the community level. Community engagement must be viewed as an 
essential police function that solves problems and reduces costs. Police commanders are 
now necessary advocates for essential police-community services. Keeping their officers’ 
current on the latest trends and sentiments in their community must be similarly 
prioritized. The added benefit of this method of police-community collaboration allows 
community concerns to drive and influence police training and preparedness activities 
that place the onus of responsibility where it rightfully belongs in a democratic republic, 
with the community and political leadership.  
Federal and state funding for training exercises between schools and law 
enforcement has recently decreased.290  This is short-sighted, unfortunate and must be 
reversed because only through adequate planning and preparation of effective response 
techniques can communities lower the number of deaths and injuries caused by these 
incidents. Planning and preparation solves an array of complex problems. Implementation 
of the strategies suggested in this thesis and refined in the next chapter may be cost-
neutral but are clearly not cost-negative. Further erosion of the fiscal commitment of 
federal and state government will come with risk to our nation’s security.  
 
                                                 




X. RECOMMENDATIONS – MAKING SURE: “IT WILL NEVER 
HAPPEN HERE” 
A. PREVENTING EXTREME VIOLENCE 
This thesis sought to answer a specific research question: Can institutions of 
higher learning better prepare to prevent and respond to school shootings and thus protect 
themselves from criminal acts of extreme violence? This thesis has shown that 
institutions of higher learning, in collaboration with other key community elements, can 
in fact reduce school shootings to an irreducible minimum. They can also reduce the 
devastating impacts of these tragic events—if they do occur—through more thorough and 
proactive planning, as well as the development of coordinated response techniques.  
Building complex adaptive learning environments requires trust. Individuals, 
institutions and communities (2IC) responsible for the safety and security of university 
and college campuses must work better together to develop and implement policies to 
prepare, prevent, respond and survive acts of extreme violence. By creating a 
collaborative adaptive learning environment, students, educators, police and public 
officials jointly share responsibility for creating a safer community, increasing both 
connectedness and connectivity,291 and thus, lowering a community’s level of anonymity, 
which is widely regarded as an attractive environment for crime and other malevolent 
acts.292  These findings may be applicable to the community at large: Cities, towns and 
counties (parishes) because it is from the whole of community that the specific strategies 
are identified, defined and implemented. 
Secondary questions answered in this thesis include the requisite level of 
preparation and planning activities necessary to actually prevent acts of extreme violence  
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on college campuses. These activities include prevention, protection, response and 
resiliency activities to reduce occurrences, as well as diminish the significant impacts of 
incidents when they do occur. 
No two communities are exactly alike, nor any two jurisdictions precisely 
comparable. Therefore, each component must be tailored to local standards and 
capabilities, laws and regulations, cultures and techniques. Planning requires 
perseverance, dedication and hard work. Exploring universities to insure the right people 
are at the table will require determination. Commitment at the very top of the university 
hierarchy is essential. Police commanders, who have the most to gain and arguably the 
most to lose, must view this investment as an integral job component.  
Some things can be changed immediately while others must be changed over 
time. Adaptability is the key. As threats, techniques, and capabilities change, so must 
individuals, institutions and communities. The most important components are to 
establish trust, direction and movement. Once a process is identified to establish 
direction, a strategy has been created. Implementing it in incremental steps requires 
honest conversations and hard work. 
Tertiary questions included: What role does active shooter training and other 
types of advanced interdiction training for police, faculty, staff and students have in 
increasing survivability, organizational effectiveness and advancing the field of policing 
in the 21st century?  
The prevention, protection, response and resiliency strategies suggested in this 
thesis are all iterative and interactive for community leaders, government officials, 
legislators, planners and responders. This collaboration results in a much more robust and 
resilient community focused on public safety.  
Prevention begins with public and political support. Thorough planning and 




campuses results in better hazard reduction. Specific recommendations, implemented 
using the three approaches outlined in the last chapter, are detailed below. 
By far the leading singular variable that would have the greatest impact on 
limiting school violence is prohibiting the possession of firearms from youth and for 
people of all ages while at school. As we have seen above, gun policy is currently driven 
by academic dishonesty, rhetoric and not by scientific information.293 A nation may well 
be judged by how well it protects its children.294 In terms of youth violence, the United 
States does very poorly. The United States has the highest death rate for children among 
the 25 richest nations in the world. The U.S. also has 17 times the homicide rate and ten 
times the firearm suicide rate295 of these countries.296  Keeping guns out of the hands of 
children appears to be of the greatest consequence. 
All persons possessing firearms on a college or university campus should be 
required to register with the police, and those not authorized by law enforcement should 
be required to surrender their lethal weapons. 
No one should be permitted to possess a firearm on campus, except specifically 
authorized, on-duty law enforcement personnel. The International Association of College 
Law Enforcement Administrators recommends police officers on college campuses 
should have a full range of use-of-force options including firearms. The Bureau of Justice 
Statistics reports 80 percent of public institutions and 40 percent of private colleges arm 
their police officers with deadly weapons.297  Because active shooters often use multiple 
sophisticated weapons, university police officers should have immediate functional 
                                                 
293 Hemenway, “Private Guns Public Health,” 3. 
294 Ibid. 
295 The nonfirearm suicide rate is the same as the 25 richest nations. 
296 Hemenway, “Private Guns Public Health,” 4. 





access to a firearm to respond effectively.298  Unarmed police officers are of little value 
during a school shooting incident. 
In the Supreme Court decision District of Columbia, et al. vs. Heller, No 07–290, 
the court held that the opinion of the court was “not to cast doubt on long standing 
prohibitions,” on the possession of firearms by felons or the mentally ill or laws 
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive locations, such as schools and government 
buildings or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.    
Legislatures at the federal and state level must be held politically accountable for 
providing access to firearms to dangerous people. Keeping guns out of the hands of 
criminals, the mentally ill and other dangerous and impulsive people through background 
checks for all gun purchases is important, but so is reducing the lethality of these 
weapons. One means is through technology available today that restricts the use of 
firearms only to those authorized to use them. Technology can also lower fatalities by 
reducing the muzzle velocity and rate of fire and reducing ammunition magazine 
capacity. Legislatures can alternatively prohibit the manufacture of certain types of 
excessively dangerous, unsafe and defective firearms, as well as certain types 
ammunition or simply restrict their sale to the military or police. 
Establishing safe environments is essential to preventing gun violence. Creating a 
collaborative community of students, faculty, and staff as well as police and political 
leaders is vital. These communities must ensure that people who need help get help, and 
those seeking help are provided competent care. In all of the above cases, the perpetrator 
lacked a rational explanation for his/her actions. This finding is consistent with other 
studies that determined that in 50 percent of all mass murder incidents in schools and 75 
                                                 
298 Functional access includes not only the physical possession of an operable and loaded firearm but 





percent of all school shootings the perpetrator indicated a prior willingness to commit the 
act with little or no rational justification.299  
B. ESTABLISHING COLLECTIVE LEARNING  
1. Role of the School Assessment Team 
High-level administrative support for campus public safety is an absolute 
imperative. Colleges and universities must keep pace with the increased demand for the 
knowledge and skill sets necessary to prevent and respond to campus safety events. The 
nature of extreme violence requires the inclusion of university administrators, 
researchers, teachers, mental health experts, and public safety and security experts in 
order to have a depth of critical resources to research and disseminate information.  
Universities should be incentivized to teach new skills and embed professors in 
public health and public safety organizations to conduct research and learn about the 
knowledge and training expertise needed in these complex learning environments.  
Communities must develop programs and long-term strategies to share 
information and create true learning environments. These programs and strategies include 
School Assessment Teams, MACTAC and Joint Counter Terrorism Attack Workshop 
(JCTAWS).  
As part of establishing these collective learning environments, School Assessment 
Teams should be created to analyze all manner and types of policies and problems and 
draw up competent solutions. The School Assessment Team, led by the college or 
university president, should be composed of specially selected and trained administrators, 
police officers, faculty, staff and students with specific expertise necessary to evaluate 
and solve complex problems. The School Assessment Team meets regularly to share 
information, discuss upcoming projects or changes in operations, curriculum standards, 
new policies or procedures, analyze threats, and develop mitigation strategies.  
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The School Assessment Team coordinates Active Shooter Awareness Workshops 
and other training and exercise opportunities. Active Shooter Awareness Workshops are 
training opportunities for police, educators and students. They engage the whole-of-
community concepts, including police and school personnel, in a continuous dialogue and 
collaborative process of learning, knowledge transfer and information sharing. The police 
review existing policies, plans and procedures that will be used to respond to an active 
shooter event at a school with their civilian counterparts. Best practices and survival 
tactics are discussed. School Assessment Teams identify evacuation routes, designate 
sheltering locations and points of contact. Police trainers discuss with their civilian 
counterparts methods of communicating information about suspicious, unusual or 
dangerous activity. The police also train civilian employees about how to report 
emergency events, initial notifications, updates and important information that can guide 
and facilitate police response:  Number of attackers, type of weapons, location and 
direction of attack. Police also provide facility specific information about how to contact 
the police, useful technology, how to remain in contact with the police, how to assist 
others in evacuation, procedures for cover and concealment and what to expect upon 
arrival of the police during an actual active shooter emergency. School employees who 
have the most intimate knowledge about the facility, such as school custodians, building 
engineers, and janitors provide the police with information about building plans, likely 
evacuation and escape routes, areas to hide and other critical information. They can also 
provide details about suspicious people and activities that the police may not be aware of. 
Active Shooter Awareness Workshops should be documented in properly formatted 
guidebooks and shared with other school officials to use as a response template to 
develop their own programs based on individual threats and vulnerabilities. 
The School Assessment Team provides training and resources, as well as a back-
flow information loop to university administrators such as: Admissions, to enhance the 
screening of applicants to identify personal adjustment issues, University Departments 
and Student Affairs, to expel students whose chances of academic success are remote, 




The team should provide faculty, staff and students information about available 
resources, while encouraging faculty members to set reasonable expectations of academic 
performance and ensure students have access to mental health counseling. 
Student orientations are perfect opportunities for individuals, institutions and 
communities to develop bonds of trust, encouragement and enlightenment. Continuing 
this engagement throughout student’s academic experience is crucial. Courses and 
components of courses in writing, philosophy, morality and ethics to teach and explore 
student’s philosophical beliefs, thoughts and aspirations are not only keys in developing 
competent and engaged community leaders but also civic-minded members of society.  
2. Role of the Police 
Keeping police officers and campus security agents visible and accessible is an 
important part of the prevention strategy. Getting police engaged and responsible for the 
safety and security of their community by establishing trusting relationships, 
conversations, and information-sharing is a critical component of prevention. Police and 
security agents are great public relations people:  They are smart, well trained and 
knowledgeable. Police commanders must guide and inform them to keep them relevant to 
the institution and the community.     
Protection includes secondary prevention strategies and the foundation of 
competent response strategies. Protection components include:  Requiring persons 
carrying firearms to register with campus police and securing weapons for those who are 
not authorized to have them, installing weapons detectors in strategic locations and 
performance venues where large numbers of people gather, arresting individuals violating 
the law, maintaining current data bases for domestic violence warrants, mental health 
orders and orders of protection, installing protective barriers in classrooms and other 
areas for likely victims to take cover and conceal themselves should an event occur, and 
training students, faculty and staff on how to respond if an active shooter attack takes 
place. These are just a few of the protective measures necessary for students, faculty and 




Police protective measures include the necessary training regimens for an 
effective school shooting interdiction program including prevention, protection, response 
and resiliency components. These include activities such as:  Threat assessment training, 
community outreach and engagement, tactical response training, multiple jurisdictional 
and cross discipline planning conferences and the effective use of technology, canines 
and equipment.   
3. Tactical and Training Considerations 
The Department of Homeland Security will direct the Secret Service to identify 
trends in campus crime and safety, as well as compile a federal database in coordination 
with the Department of Education to assure the timely reporting of all violent crime on 
college campuses. The Secretaries of Homeland Security and Education will establish a 
task force to study all aspects of the extreme violence and develop competent solutions: 
training, education, further academic research. The Secretary of DHS will immediately 
direct the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology to create a research 
apparatus with ATF&E to identify life-saving technologies to protect people and detect 
guns, pursue scientific research into gun safety and prevention strategies, and assemble 
coalitions of educators, medical and mental health professional to conduct this research. 
It will be the responsibility of The Department of Education to coordinate, 
develop and collect information about educational programs and training assistance 
services to begin a training academy for educators, administrators, public and mental 
health professionals and public safety experts to join forces to develop localized 
resources to prevent, protect, respond and survive incidents of extreme violence on 
college campuses. 
The Department of Education will lead ATF and Secret Service assessment 
efforts at developing high tech tools to prevent school violence. These assessment tools 
will aid in evaluating threats, deciding whether or not they are substantive, and create 




identifying and implementing safety plans tailored to specific school environments based 
on school size, culture and climate.300    
The FBI will insure the NICS data is complete and entered in a timely manner.  
Virtual training and “Pop-up Training” are novel approaches suggested for those 
perishable skills that must be practiced regularly to maintain capabilities.  
Virtual training is Internet-based computer training, similar to flight simulators 
for pilots. Officers receive training in policies, such as firearm justification, use of force, 
force continuums, etc., and then they are confronted with an array of computer-based 
simulations. They must make split-second decisions based on knowledge and experience 
during the video training (shoot/don’t shoot) scenarios. Virtual training can be quite 
elaborate, using advanced simulators that can track hand and eye coordination and 
accuracy. Record keeping and officer improvement over time are important components 
of all training.  
“Pop-up Training” is scenario-based training set in real world environments 
instead of classrooms. The most elaborate example proposed is pop-up active shooter 
training. This training features four firearms instructors, (two trainers and two safety 
officers), who establish an active shooter training gallery in an unused and contained 
public area. Two patrol officers from one or two jurisdictions are dispatched to the scene 
to simulate a response to an actual call for service. Upon arrival, they are safety checked 
and provided an hour of instruction with tactical simulated ammunition scenario-based 
components imbedded into the training hour. At the end of the training period, officers 
resume patrol. There are many opportunities in policing to find efficiencies in patrol 
operations; these efficiencies can yield life-saving training that is an important 
component of policing and must remain a top priority. 
Officers must make a personal commitment to training. Fitness and wellness are 
critical components in health, professional performance and well being. Making good 
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decisions requires police officers to have the mental dexterity and physical fitness to rely 
on more than gross motor skills. More than just showing up when training is scheduled, 
officers must take the time necessary to physically and mentally prepare themselves and 
condition their bodies for the demands of police work.301   
Additional protection measures for schools include training and exercises that 
involve civilian personnel to help them survive an active shooter event, provide real-time 
information to responding officers, save others, and if possible, take action against the 
active shooter. Take Action, Take Cover and Take Back, and Run, Hide and Fight302 are 
similar affirmative action plans to survive active shooter attacks.  
Effective response requires knowledgeable police action, intelligently performed, 
by well-trained police officers, staff and students. In the event of an active school shooter 
event, police officers must be ready and willing to execute that training immediately and 
at considerable risk. By leveraging their participation and involvement with the School 
Assessment Team, the police possess the intelligence and information necessary to 
respond to an array of dangerous situations.  
Resilience is assured when a crisis is averted. When a crisis cannot be prevented, 
good relationships increase the likelihood of positive outcomes and can restore 
equilibrium more quickly. Using whole-of-government concepts ensures a coordinated 
and compassionate response to victims and relatives. Understanding policy and 
techniques for various emergency responders and knowing the people providing the 
information is an important function of resilience. As a result, communications are 
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trusted and better understood, people are more comfortable asking questions and getting 
the right information to the right people more quickly.303     
C. HADDON’S MATRIX 
The foregoing thesis recommends a whole-of-community based focus and an 
appreciative model of the strengths inherent in colleges and universities across the nation. 
Public health and public safety organizations must work together to build cohesive 
communities in law enforcement and academia to offer scholarship, information sharing, 
mentorships, and internships to create vibrant learning environments. The current 
learning deficit is real. 
A public health approach to school shootings focuses on prevention. It is based on 
the work of Haddon and extended and clarified by Hemenway. It also leverages previous 
scholarship at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security by the work of Ted Lewis’s 
risk-based threat assessments, Tracy Frazzano’s multijurisdictional active shooter 
training and ongoing scholarship by Chris Bellavita defining the homeland security 
enterprise and its component features.    
Planning, practice and response are inextricably interwoven and cannot be 
separated.  
The School Assessment Teams agenda can be generated from Haddon’s Matrix, 
when it is applied to extreme violence in educational environments. While all the items 
may not initially appear to be within the jurisdiction of the School Assessment Team, a 
closer examination will provoke a keen awareness among the team’s members of the 
scope and complexity of school violence and what must be done about it. 
Primary Prevention (Pre-Injury or Pre-Event Phase) 
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1. Prevent the initial creation of the hazard 
a. Require background check for all persons prior to purchase of guns 
(advocacy and research) 
b. Prohibit the manufacture of certain dangerous weapons (advocacy 
and research) 
c. Prevent guns from being brought on to campus  
d. Register all persons who possess guns and ensure these weapons 
are not carried on campus 
e. Screen all students prior to admission for personal development 
and likelihood of academic success 
f. Create opportunities for evaluative community engagement 
throughout the curriculum 
g. Respond to persons concerns, complaints and frustrations 
h. Create an environment that encourages learning from failure 
i. Establish the university as a gun-free zone 
j. Use technology to rapidly detect changes in the environment such 
as CCTV, SMART phones and gunshot detection technology.  
2. Reduce the amount of hazard 
a. Encourage police to engage the community and use less lethal 
methods 
b. Prohibit manufacture of specific types of ammunition and large 
capacity magazines 
c. Enact and enforce legislation that prohibits firearms in educational 
environments 
3. Prevent the release of a hazard that already exists 
a. Store firearms safely 
b. Arrest and expel firearms offenders 




d. Ban firearms from campus, classroom, and buildings. 
Secondary Prevention (Injury or Event Phase) 
4. Modify the rate of release or spatial distribution of the hazard 
a. Require the registration of all firearms 
b. Improve gun tracing and training 
c. Take firearms out of the hands of criminals, mental ill persons and 
people with a history of exhibiting violent, angry outbursts 
5. Separate in time and/or space the hazard and person protected 
a. Require waiting periods for firearms purchases (advocacy and 
research) 
b. Require reflection after conflict 
c. Install weapons detectors at buildings, classrooms and other large 
venues 
d. Arrest criminals and confiscate firearms  
6. Create a barrier between the hazard and person to be protected 
a. Provide bullet-proof vests 
b. Install bullet-proof barriers 
7. Modify structures and contact surfaces to reduce injury 
a. Redesign bullets to reduce injury 
b. Redesign firearms to reduce rate of fire and muzzle velocity  
8. Strengthen the resistance of the person to the hazard 
a. Provide active shooter training for responders and community 
b. Provide counseling 
c. Train people in self defense 
d. Provide first responders access to video feeds and other information 





9. Rapidly detect and limit damage 
a. Improve law enforcement response to eliminate threat and prevent 
further injury and death 
b. Improve emergency medical response training 
c. Provide rapid transport for victims to emergency departments 
d. Assure prompt arrest and incarceration for firearm offenders 
e. Eliminate threat 
10. Initiate immediate reparative actions  
a. Improve physical rehabilitation for victims 
b. Improve counseling for victims of violence 
c. Assure accessibility of educational and work place areas to those 
disabled by firearms. 
d. Return to normal operations 
The Department of Education is well positioned to champion and lead this effort 
with the assistance of public health officials because there is currently no unified body of 
knowledge that examines extreme violence on school campuses. Public health officials, 
including The American Medical Association, Center for Disease Prevention and 
American College of Surgeons led the injury prevention efforts to interdict highway 
fatalities and injuries. This successful experience will be instrumental in preventing gun 





On January 16, 2013, the president of the United States signed several 
Presidential Memorandum directing law enforcement, public health, education and 
mental health professionals to work better together to strengthen background checks for 
all gun sales and improve emergency preparedness.304 The president called for long-term 
research by engaging in public health research on the causes and prevention of gun 
violence stating in his remarks about the memorandum “we don’t benefit from 
ignorance.”  
The Presidential action to reduce gun violence includes a ban on military-style 
assault weapons and high-capacity magazines. The memorandum encourages Congress to 
make it illegal for members of the public to possess armor-piercing bullets, advocates 
more tools and resources for law enforcement to prevent and prosecute gun crimes, and 
encourages research through the Center from Disease Control to look at the causes of gun 
violence. 
The plan calls for Congress to help make schools safer by supporting up to 1,000 
school resource officers and mental health professionals and ensure schools have 
comprehensive emergency management plans in place. The plan increases health care 
coverage to ensure that students and young adults can get access to the mental health 
treatment they may need.305  A summary of the plan is attached as Appendix A. 
While this proposal is encouraging, it is only actionable with the consent, support 
and encouragement of the American people. As this paper has shown, with examples 
from the Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the American Medical Association, 
Congress is slow to react unless there is considerable public support for clearly defined 
actions.  
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It is perhaps the president’s request for additional research that is most 
encouraging. No one study is definitive. It is only through the accumulation of 
information through research and sufficient understanding that true knowledge gained. 
All studies, including this one, have inherent limitations. Refining this area of study to 
examine a broad cross section of causation and correlation ranging from mental health, to 
self defense, to non hand gun homicides are important.  
Missing from most studies is the importance of gun training requirements. Fire 
arms are precision instruments. In the hands of expertly trained police officers, they can 
save lives, in the hands of a novice or one who has allowed once formidable skills to 
deteriorate they are instruments of death and disaster. Firearm proficiency is a perishable 
skill, one that requires regular and frequent training and mandatory qualification 
requirements that include legal justification and use of force training and psychological 
testing. Marksmen who show a psychological deficit or a propensity for violence should 
be banned from hand gun possession. 
Author’s Note: While this thesis focuses exclusively on school shootings as 
examples of extreme violence on college campuses, I would be remiss not to mention 
other more pernicious elements of extreme violence that occur much more frequently on 
college campuses across America. These include the sexual assault of women and bias 
crimes based on sexual orientation and gender identification. It is hoped through the 
knowledge, guidance and strategies contained in this thesis that the homeland security 
enterprise will recognize and seize opportunities to educate all members of academia and 
the public to address these, as well as other pervasive and prevalent acts of extreme 
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